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I. Introduction
A. The Medicaid Program
The Federal Medicaid Program was created through con-
gressional enactment of Title XIX of the Social Security
Amendments of 1965.1 It was designed to expand existing social
welfare programs by providing federal funds to assist individuals
"whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of
necessary medical services .. . . 2 The program, funded jointly
by the state and federal governments, is administered solely by
the states in accordance with guidelines established by the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare.'
While the goal of furnishing the poor with greater access to
health care services has been generally met,4 the Medicaid pro-
1. Social Security Amendments of 1965, ch. 531, 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
2. Social Security Amendments of 1965, ch. 531, 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). The Social Security Amendments
of 1965 replaced the Kerr-Mills Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 924 (repealed 1965), which neither
protected persons under age 65 nor mandated the provision of any specific medical ser-
vices. In addition, many states did not participate in the Kerr-Mills program and most of
those that did participate had only limited programs. See Comment, Furor Over Medi-
caid, 3 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 158, 161 (1967).
3. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.0 to
456.657 (1985). The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), formerly
known as the Federal Security Agency, was established in 1939. In 1979, when the Office
of Education became a new and separate entity, HEW was renamed the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS). As the second-largest federal department (after the
Department of Defense), HHS is responsible for the administration of over 300 federal
health and human service programs including the Social Security Administration which
controls the Medicaid program.
4. It has been suggested that the enactment of Medicaid has contributed to the "ef-
fective collapse of major barriers to access" to health services for low income persons.
See Cohen, Medicare, Medicaid: 10 Lessons Learned, 59 HosprrALs 44 (1985). But see
Friedman, Indigent Care: Where the Marketplace Fails, 59 HosprrAJs 48 (1985) (noting
that Medicaid covers only between 38-46% of the population near or below the federally
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gram itself is "riddled with provider fraud" and abuse.5 This
peculation by providers of medical services, coupled with pro-
gram inefficiency and inflationary pressures, has resulted in a
state of fiscal crisis within the Medicaid programs and a nation-
wide demand for cost constraint.
Title XIX attempted to avert abuse of the Medicaid pro-
gram through statutory provisions requiring providers of Medi-
caid services to maintain and produce upon demand medical
records relating to services for which payment was sought.8 Sub-
sequent legislation, which remains in effect today, provided for
the establishment of state-controlled Medicaid Fraud Control
recognized poverty level).
5. See Comment, White Collar Crime: A Survey of Law, 18 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 169,
287 (1980). See also Cohen, supra note 4, at 44. See generally Pontell, Jesilow & Geis,
Policing Physicians: Practitioner Fraud and Abuse in a Government Medicaid Pro-
gram, 30 Soc. PROB. 117 (1982); Lee, Fraud and Abuse in Medicare and Medicaid, 30
AD. L. REV. 1 (1978); Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A
Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 245 n.6 (1978).
6. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 44. It is difficult to determine exactly how much of
the over $22 billion spent annually by the federal and state governments for Medicaid is
spent improperly. Estimates suggest that up to 20% of money expended has been misap-
plied for unnecessary services or fraudulent billing. NATIONAL Ass'N. or ArORNEYS GEN-
ERAL, CONTROLLING MEDICAID FRAUD 5 (1977).
In 1983 hearings by the Senate Special Committee on Aging, Chairman John Heinz
stated:
Over the past 15 years, this committee has uncovered extensive and dramatic ex-
amples of the problems inherent in our present cost-based retrospective payment
system of health insurance. We have documented shocking examples of fraud,
waste, and abuse, which I estimated last fall to amount to the stunning total of
$10 billion annually in both Medicare and Medicaid.... It is a measure of the
failure of our present reimbursement system that these fraud, waste and quality of
care problems have proved resistant to all of our determined efforts to eliminate
them.
Quality Assurance Under Prospective Reimbursement Programs: Hearing Before the
Select Committee on Aging, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1983). See generally Medicaid
Payments for Ineligible Persons: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Repre-
sentatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1977) (statement of Joseph Califano on improper
and wasteful payments in the Medicaid program); Fraud and Racketeering in Medicare
and Medicaid: Hearing before the House Select Committee on Aging, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 14-15 (1978) (statement of Congressman John Abnor estimating that fraud con-
sumes up to 10% of federal expenditures for health and welfare programs).
7. See generally Inglehart, Health Policy Report Medical Care of the Poor - A
Growing Problem, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 59 (1985); Wing, Recent Amendments to the
Medicaid Program: Political Implications, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 83 (1984).
8. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 234(a), 81 Stat. 821,
906 (1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(27) (1982)).
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/4
CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS
Units for the investigation and prosecution of criminal
violations.9
In 1977, Congress responded to widespread fraud within the
program by enacting the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and
Abuse Amendments."0 These statutes augmented existing statu-
tory provisions by reclassifying as felonies most fraudulent bill-
ing practices of health care providers and expanding penalties
for their violation." The amendments further empowered the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to
suspend convicted providers from further participation in the
program,12 and required public disclosure of the names of prov-
iders who had been convicted of Medicaid offenses.'3
B. The Issue
Among physicians who have been sanctioned for abuse of
government medical benefit programs, psychiatrists comprise a
disproportionately large share of the total. 4 Eight percent of the
approximately 380,000 physicians currently practicing in the
United States are psychiatrists.' From the advent of the Medi-
9. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142,
§ 17(c), 91 Stat. 1175, 1201-02 (1977) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(q) (1982)).
10. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91
Stat. 1175 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 26 and 42 U.S.C.). Prior
to 1977, prosecution of Medicaid fraud generally occurred through the combined applica-
tion of 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1001 (1982) (federal false claims provisions); 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-
35 (1982) (federal false claims provisions); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1982); and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396h (1982).
11. Maximum penalties were increased to fines of up to $25,000 or up to five years
imprisonment, or both. 42 U.S.C.A § 1395nn(a), 42 U.S.C.A § 1396h(a) (1982 & West
Supp. 1985).
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(e) (1982 & West Supp. 1985).
13. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-5(a)(2) (1982 & West Supp. 1985). For a detailed analysis of
the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments see Comment, supra note 5,
at 286-87. See also Laudicina & Schneider, The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and
Abuse Amendments of 1977: Implications for the Poor, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 843
(1978).
14. Geis, Jesilow, Pontell & O'Brien, Fraud and Abuse of Government Medical
Benefit Programs by Psychiatrists, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 231, 233 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Geis]. The largest proportion of suspensions involved general practitioners
(27'/). This figure, however, is approximately equal to their proportion in the medical
community. Id. See generally Towery & Sharfstein, Fraud and Abuse in Psychiatric
Practice, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 92 (1978) (discussing fraudulent and abusive practices in
psychiatry).
15. Geis, supra note 14, at 231. Approximately 10% of all Medicaid expenditures
19861
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caid program in 1967 through 1982, psychiatrists have repre-
sented 18.4% of the total number of physicians suspended for
Medicaid fraud or abuse.16
As part of an investigation of suspected Medicaid billing
fraud, the medical records of provider physicians are frequently
subpoenaed. In many cases, psychiatrists have refused to pro-
duce patient records claiming that these files are protected from
disclosure by way of a psychotherapist-patient or physician-pa-
tient evidentiary privilege.17 Psychiatrists have also claimed that
such files are protected by the constitutional right of privacy.18
In the context of Medicaid fraud investigations, courts have
generally focused on an analysis of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege when dealing with challenges to subpoenas for psychi-
atric records.19 In these decisions, courts have compelled the
production of the entire or limited portions of the psychiatric
record, regardless of whether or not the privilege had been rec-
ognized.20 Although the constitutional privacy issue has often
are for psychiatric services. Two-thirds of the financing for psychiatric care comes from
the government. Id.; Sharfstein, Fraud Committed by Psychiatrists, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 219 (1985).
16. Geis, supra note 14, at 231 (suggesting that since psychiatrists charge patients
for time rather than for services, they are more readily apprehended than other physi-
cians who also may be guilty of fraudulent billing practices). See also Mitchell & Crom-
well, Medicaid Participation by Psychiatrists in Private Practice, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
810 (1982) (Psychiatrists who participated in the Medicaid program were more likely to
be foreign medical graduates. Psychiatrists with large Medicaid practices saw signifi-
cantly more patients each week but spent less time with each patient.).
17. See, e.g., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983). See also infra notes 24-146
and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y, Dist. Branch of the Am. Psychiatric Ass'n v.
Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii 1979). See also infra notes 147-293 and accompa-
nying text.
Some psychiatrists have also claimed protection under the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. These claims have been uniformly dismissed. See, e.g., Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum v. Kuriansky, 113 A.D.2d 49, 50, 495 N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (1st
Dep't 1985); Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 642 (6th Cir. 1983); People v. Doe, 59 N.Y.2d 655,
656, 450 N.E.2d 211, 212 (1983); United States v. Witt, 542 F. Supp. 696, 698 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
19. Some courts do not recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege and have based
their decision on the physician-patient privilege instead. See cases cited infra notes 37-
49 and accompanying text.
20. Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 642. (While acknowledging the "compelling necessity" for
recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the court nonetheless ordered the
production of records containing the names of patients, the dates of treatment and the
length of treatment on each date.); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 441 A.2d 525, 531
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been raised in lower courts and on appeal, no court has yet to
fully analyze and resolve the issue of whether such a right pro-
tects against disclosure of patient files.21
Attorneys for psychotherapists have urged that, in the con-
text of Medicaid fraud investigations, the constitutional right of
privacy affords greater protection for psychotherapeutic records
than does the physician-patient or psychotherapist-patient priv-
ilege.22 Testing this hypothesis, this Comment will analyze and
compare those protections afforded by the evidentiary privileges
and the constitutional right of privacy as they apply to psycho-
therapeutic records.
Part II of this Comment begins with a discussion of the psy-
chotherapist-patient evidentiary privilege: its common law and
statutory origins, and its application by the courts in cases in-
volving the compelled disclosure of psychiatric records in Medi-
caid fraud investigations. The constitutional right of privacy will
be discussed in Part III with a comparative eye toward the psy-
(R.I. 1982) (noting statutorily created patient-physician privileges stand as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of federal medicaid laws, which require disclosure of
patient records for fraud investigations and, as such, must yield to federal law);
Camperlengo v. Blum, 56 N.Y.2d 251, 252, 436 N.E.2d 1299, 1300, 451 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594
(1982) ("The physician-patient privilege does not absolutely protect a doctor's records of
treatment of Medicaid patients from a subpoena of the State Department of Social Ser-
vices issued in an investigation of billing practices.").
21. In Zuniga, the Sixth Circuit assumed arguendo that the constitutional right of
privacy encompassed patients' interests in preventing disclosure of personal information
sought by a grand jury. Due to the extremely limited nature of the information sought in
the grand jury investigation, a detailed analysis of the constitutional issue was not car-
ried out. In Ariyoshi, although the District Court of Hawaii did provide guidelines for
the analysis of constitutional privacy rights as they apply to psychiatric records, the
court did not complete its constitutional analysis. The plaintifls objective in Ariyoshi
was to obtain an injunction to forestall enforcement of a Hawaii statute authorizing the
issuance of administrative inspection warrants to search the records and offices of Medi-
caid providers. Since the court was considering preliminary injunctive relief, it assessed
only the probability of success on the merits and did not decide the constitutionality of
the Hawaii statute. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. at 1036.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Kobrin, 395
Mass. 284, 479 N.E.2d 674 (1985) also failed to consider the constitutional privacy claims
of a psychiatrist challenging subpoenas for his records pursuant to a Medicaid fraud
investigation. The court noted that since communications between a patient and psycho-
therapist were already protected by state privilege law, the federal constitutional issue
need not be reached. 395 Mass. at 288 n.9, 479 N.E.2d at 678 n.9. See also Camperlengo,
56 N.Y.2d at 253, 436 N.E.2d at 1301, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 595 (1982) (constitutional issue
not raised in lower court; therefore, not considered on appeal).




chotherapist-patient privilege. In the context of Medicaid fraud
investigations and subpoenaed psychotherapeutic records, courts
hearing both the evidentiary privilege and constitutional right
arguments have identified several factors as determinative of the
scope of protection to be afforded such records. These factors
include the magnitude of the state interest in the production of
confidential psychiatric records and the degree of intrusion into
privacy occasioned by such disclosures. The existence of safe-
guards designed to prevent unnecessary disclosures of private in-
formation is a prime element in an evaluation of the intrusive-
ness of disclosure of confidential information. The existence and
scope of such safeguards will be addressed in Part IV.
This Comment concludes that, in the context of Medicaid
fraud investigations, the protections afforded psychotherapeutic
records through the constitutional right of privacy are no greater
nor broader in scope than those generally provided through a
psychotherapist-patient privilege. Courts faced with claims of
protection under the constitutional right of privacy or the evi-
dentiary privilege must utilize a balancing analysis, weighing the
societal and governmental interests in favor of disclosure against
the societal and individual interests in maintaining the confiden-
tiality of the records.
Thus, records which do not contain confidential psychother-
apeutic communications or which are redacted so as to mask the
identities of patients are unlikely to be protected against com-
pelled disclosure due to the limited intrusion into privacy inter-
ests occasioned by such disclosure. This is particularly true in
light of the existence of various safeguards designed to protect
records, once produced by therapists, against additional unnec-
essary disclosure. Unredacted records which contain confidential
patient disclosures and other intimate data are likely to be pro-
tected against compelled disclosure under both the constitu-
tional right and the psychotherapist-patient privilege. This is
because of the substantial insult to individual privacy interests
effectuated by such disclosure and the fact that the effectiveness
of Medicaid fraud investigations is unlikely to be substantially
enhanced by the production of such confidential data. As such,
in the context of Medicaid fraud investigations, protections af-
forded psychotherapeutic records under the constitutional right
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II. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
A. History of the Privilege
For over 300 years, a fundamental legal maxim has existed
declaring that "the public has a right to every man's evidence. '24
In contrast to this maxim, the law recognizes certain communi-
cations which are protected from disclosure in legal proceedings.
Unlike other rules of exclusion which guard against the admis-
sion of unreliable or misleading evidence, 5 the laws of privilege
are based solely on a societal interest in fostering certain
relationships."
23. See infra note 314.
24. See 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 71 (McNaughton rev. 1961 and Supp.
1985). In the debate concerning a bill to pardon, in advance, witnesses who might incrim-
inate themselves in the fraud committed by Sir Robert Walpole, Earl of Oxford, Lord
Hardwicke, arguing against the bill stated:
It has, my lords, I own, been asserted by the noble duke, that the public has a
right to every man's evidence, - a maxim which in its proper sense cannot be
denied. For it is undoubtedly true that the public has a right to all the assistance
of every individual.
Id. (quoting 12 Coangrr's PARLIAma rARY HISTORY 675, 693 (n.d.)).
See also United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1949); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 688 (1972) (describing the duty to give evidence as "particularly applicable to grand
jury proceedings").
25. Among the most common exclusionary rules are the hearsay rule (FED. R. Evm.
802), the rules barring most opinion evidence (FED. R. EvD. 602, 701), the rule against
character evidence admitted to show propensity toward criminal behavior (FED. R Evm.
404), and the rule favoring admission of an original document over secondary evidence
(FED. R. EVID. 1002). See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 72, at 170-71 (3d ed.
1984).
26. See C. MCCORMICK supra note 25, § 72, at 171. See also State v. 62.96247 Acres
of Land in New Castle County, 57 Del. 40, 193 A.2d 799 (1963). Commenting on the rules
governing privileged communications, the court held that.
the duty of the confidant of nondisclosure of confidential communications is im-
posed to protect the reliance interest of the communicant, with an assent of the
community. This reliance interest is protected because such protection will en-
courage certain communications. Encouraging these communications is desirable
because the communications are necessary for the maintainance of certain rela-
tionships. It is socially desirable to foster the protected relationships because
other results are achieved, such as the promotion of justice, public health and
social stability. These goals are promoted in furtherance of a well-organized,
peaceful society, which in turn is considered necessary for human survival.
Id. at 50, 193 A.2d at 807.
See also Austin, The Use of Privileged Communications for Impeachment Pur-
1986]
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Such privileged relationships most commonly include hus-
band-wife, 27 attorney-client, 28 and priest-penitent.29 These rela-
tionships have been deemed by society to be of sufficient import
to justify protection through evidentiary privileges despite the
possible sacrifice of otherwise admissible and probative evi-
dence.30 Because such evidentiary privileges result in the with-
holding of information from the triers of fact, however, they "are
not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in
derogation of the search for truth.""1
The roots of the modern psychotherapist-patient privilege
can be found in the long tradition of recognizing as confidential
communications between physicians and their patients.3 2 At
poses, 49 N.Y. ST. B.J. 564 (1977) (suggesting a second rationale for recognition of certain
privileges in that they protect the essential privacy inherent in certain significant human
relationships).
27. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958) (recognizing the privilege
of an accused in a criminal case to prevent his or her spouse from testifying).
28. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, §§ 87-97 (3d ed. 1984). The roots of
the attorney-client privilege may extend as far back as Roman law. See Comment, The
Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REv.
487, 488 (1928).
29. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, § 77, at 186.
30. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, § 72, at 171. Various other privileges have been
asserted. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (reporters and their sources);
United States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972) (researchers and their sources); United
States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969) (accountants and their clients); In re
Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (draft counselors and their clients); Gottlieb
v. Bresler, 24 F.R.D. 371 (D.D.C. 1959) (insurance companies and their insureds).
31. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). See also McMann v. SEC. 87
F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937) (In denying a claim of privilege by a customer against dis-
closure of his investment broker's records, Judge Learned Hand indicated that, "The
supression of truth is a grievous necessity at best, more especially when as here the in-
quiry concerns the public interest; it can be justified at all only when the opposed private
interest is supreme.").
32. The Hippocratic Oath states in part: "Whatever, in connection with my profes-
sional practice, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought
not be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge as reckoning that all such be kept secret."
It is significant to note that neither the Hippocratic Oath nor the modern ethical
standards promulgated by the American Medical Association require absolute confidenti-
ality. The modern restatement of the Hippocratic Oath adopted in the American Medi-
cal Association's Principles of Medical Ethics permits physicians to divulge confidential
information when required by law. "The information disclosed to a physician during the
course of the relationship between physician and patient is confidential to the greatest
degree possible. . . .The physician should not reveal confidential communications or
information without the express consent of the patient, unless required to do so by law."
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OP THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 19 (1984).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/4
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common law, however, no physician-patient evidentiary privilege
was recognized.33 In 1829, New York became the first state to
enact a specific statutory physician-patient privilege., Today,
most states have adopted some form of physician-patient or psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege.-5  The psychotherapist-patient
privilege has also been recognized in the federal system through
judicial interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 0
See also Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L.
REV. 175, 176 n.6 (1960) (discussing the prior restatement of the Hippocratic Oath).
33. Denouncements of the physician-patient privilege can be found as early as 1776.
In the bigamy trial of the Dutchess of Kingston, the court, in compelling the noblewo-
man's physician to testify stated:
If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure he would be guilty
of a breach of honour, and of great indiscretion; but, to give that information in a
court of justice, which by the law of the land he is bound to do, will never be
imputed to him as any indiscretion whatever.
The Trial of the Dutchess of Kingston, 20 How. ST. Ta. 355, (Parl. Cas. 1776). See
Slovenko, supra note 32, at 177.
Contemporary courts have echoed these sentiments. "The considerations which re-
late to physicians and their patients do not require that an exception should be made to
the general liability of all persons to give testimony upon all facts that are the subject of
legitimate inquiry in the administration of justice." United States v. Kansas City Lu-
theran Home and Hosp. Ass'n, 297 F. Supp. 239, 244 (W.D. Mo. 1969); see Barnes v.
United States, 374 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1967).
34. The 1829 statute reads as follows:
No person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be allowed to dis-
close any information which he may have acquired in attending any patient, in a
professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him to pre-
scribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any act for him, as a surgeon.
2 N.Y. REV. STAT., pt. 3, ch. VII, § 73 (1st ed. 1829), (codified as amended at N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 4504 (McKinney 1986)). See generally Note, Patient Testimonial Privileges
Under the Proposed Code of Evidence for New York, 45 ALB. L. REV. 773 (1981) (dis-
cussing the history of the physician-patient privilege in New York).
Interestingly, soon after enactment, this physician-patient privilege was denounced
by Dean John Wigmore. Dean Wigmore set forth four conditions necessary to establish a
privilege against the disclosure of communications. They are: (1) the communication
must be made in the belief that it will not be disclosed; (2) confidentiality must be essen-
tial to the maintenance of the relationship between the parties; (3) the relationship
should be one that society considers worthy of being fostered; and (4) the injury to the
relationship caused by disclosure must be greater than the benefit gained in obtaining
the testimony. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 2285, at 527 (3d ed. 1940 and Supp. 1985).
Dean Wigmore maintained that the physician-patient relationship met only the
third condition and, therefore, should not be privileged. Id. §§ 2380-91.
35. See Comment, Evidence Law - The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Fed-
eral Courts, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 791, 791-92 (1984).
36. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides for all testimonial privileges to be "gov-
erned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. EvID. 501.
9
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B. Differentiating the Privileges
Fundamental differences between the psychotherapist-pa-
tient and physician-patient relationships dictate that they be af-
forded separate and distinct recognition and treatment. The
most significant distinction between the two is the nature of the
information exchanged in each relationship.37
Many physical ailments might be treated with some degree of ef-
fectiveness by a doctor whom the patient did not trust, but a psy-
chiatrist must have his patient's confidence or he cannot help
him. "The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone
else in the world. He exposes to the therapist not only what his
words directly express; he lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his
fantasies, his sins, and his shame .... It would be too much to
expect them to do so if they knew that all they say - and all that
the psychiatrist learns from what they say - may be revealed to
the whole world from a witness stand. '3 8
Psychiatric literature is replete with assertions that confi-
dentiality is crucial to effective psychotherapy.3 9 Studies have
demonstrated that potential breaches in the confidential rela-
tionship between patient and therapist have resulted in disincli-
nations to enter therapy"° and reluctance to convey to the
therapist information vital to successful treatment.41 Thus, com-
Analyzing this rule, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in In re Zuniga,
determined that federal law did indeed recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege. 714
F.2d 632, 638-40. See discussion infra notes 48, 50, 60-90 and accompanying text.
37. A second distinction lies in the context in which the information becomes the
subject of judicial inquiry. It is rare that the records of a psychotherapist receive judicial
attention at the request of the patient himself, while non-psychiatric testimony is often
admitted into evidence because the patient himself made it the subject of litigation.
When a third party and not the patient himself seeks access and use of such information,
the potential for abuse and prejudice is certainly intensified.
38. Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (2d Cir. 1955) (quoting Overholser,
Some Problems of the 'Criminal Insane' at Saint Elizabeths Hospital, 22 MED. ANNALS
OF D.C. 349 (1953)).
39. See, e.g., Dubey, Confidentiality as a Requirement of the Therapist: Technical
Necessities for Absolute Privilege in Psychotherapy, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1093 (1974);
Schwed, Kuvin & Baliga, Medicaid Audit: Crisis in Confidentiality and the Patient-
Psychiatrist Relationship, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 447 (1979); Grossman, Insurance Re-
ports as a Threat to Confidentiality, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 64, 67 (1971). See also infra
notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
40. See Meyer & Smith, A Crisis in Group Therapy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 638
(1977).




pelling a breach in the confidentiality of the psychotherapeutic
relationship may be counterproductive to important societal in-
terests in fostering treatment for the emotionally disturbed, '
and may additionally place therapists in a professionally and
morally intolerable position."3
The threat of compelled disclosure of psychiatric records
not only has a direct deleterious effect on the patient and the
psychotherapeutic relationship, it also threatens the effective-
ness of future therapy. Fearing possible disclosure, therapists
treating Medicaid patients may alter their recordkeeping rou-
tines, omitting certain patient communications or other signifi-
cant revelations." Such omissions may retard the therapeutic
Determine the Effect of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165, 182-84 (1978) (study revealed
approximately one fourth of surveyed therapists had observed a reluctance to discuss
violent tendencies when patients were informed of a possible breach of confidentiality).
See generally, Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976) (holding that psychotherapists owe an affirmative duty to third parties
threatened by patients under the psychotherapists' care).
42. One commentator has suggested:
It seems to this writer that any values to judicial administration inherent in at-
tempts to force the psychotherapist to disgorge the secrets of his patients are
overbalanced by: (1) the inducement to perjury implicit in such attempts and (2)
the harm to the human personality, and hence to freedom, in governmental forc-
ing of a serious conflict of conscience.
Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World: Part 1 41 MINN. L. REv. 731, 750
(1957).
43. The maintenance of confidentiality is required by the codes of ethics of most
major psychiatric and psychological organizations. See American Psychiatric Association,
Position Statement on Confidentiality and Privilege with Special Reference to Psychi-
atric Patients, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 175, 175-76 (1968); American Psychological Associ-
ation, Standards for Providers of Psychological Services, APA MONrroR, March 1975 at
19.
44. In Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y, Dist. Branch of the Am. Psychiatric Ass'n v.
Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1042 (D. Hawaii 1979) the court noted that:
Psychiatrists may be disinclined to record in their files extremely personal, sensi-
tive confidences of a patient if they know those files may be reviewed and copied
by state officials at any time. The threat of searches may therefore decrease the
likelihood that the very information most valuable to another treating psychia-
trist, a history of the patient's emotional and mental problems, will be available.
Id.
See also Sharfstein, Towery & Milowe, Accuracy of Diagnostic Information Submitted
to an Insurance Company, 137 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 70 (1980) (study demonstrated that
diagnostic information submitted to insurance companies by psychiatrists is often inac-
curate because of concerns about patient confidentiality).
Some authorities have suggested that psychotherapists keep billing records separate
from those containing confidential communications. Others have suggested that psycho-
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capacity of subsequent treating psychotherapists who, in neces-
sary reliance on these records, will consequently lack a complete
and accurate history of the patient's illness.4 5
There is "a growing consensus throughout the country, re-
flected in a trend of legislative enactments, acknowledg[ing] that
an environment of confidentiality of treatment is vitally impor-
tant to the successful operation of psychotherapy. '"' Indeed, the
trend in both state and federal courts is toward acknowledgment
of the unique nature of the psychotherapist-patient relation-
ship 47 and toward granting the psychotherapist-patient privilege
recognition independent of the physician-patient privilege.'8 The
therapists keep no records whatsoever regarding patient communications. See generally
Slovenko, On the Need for Record Keeping in the Practice of Psychiatry, 7 J. PSYCHIA-
TRY & L. 399, 400-01 (1979); HOFLING, LAW AND ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY,
77-81 (1981).
45. See Mitchell, Pyle & Hatsukami, Requesting Previous Psychiatric Records Do
They Come and are They Worth Obtaining?, 169 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASES 364,
366 (1981) ("Significant problems which may prove important to diagnosis and treat-
ment may be uncovered through obtaining previous medical records.").
46. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 422, 467 P.2d 557, 560-61, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 837
(1970). Support for this trend was stated most convincingly in the Advisory Committee's
note to Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504:
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain confidenti-
ality. His capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon their willing-
ness and ability to talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for him to
function without being able to assure his patients of confidentiality and, indeed,
privileged communication. Where there may be exceptions to this general
rule . . . , there is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for suc-
cessful psychiatric treatment. The relationship may well be likened to that of the
priest-penitent or the lawyer-client. Psychiatrists not only explore the very depths
of their patients' conscious, but their unconscious feelings and attitudes as well.
Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a patient's awareness and, in
order to do this, it must be possible to communicate freely. A threat to secrecy
blocks successful treatment.
FED. R. EVID. 504 advisory committee note (proposed 1972), (quoting GROUP FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 45, 92 (1960)).
47. Commentators in favor of a psychotherapist-patient privilege argue that this
privilege satisfies Dean Wigmore's standards for legitimacy, being more analagous to the
priest-penitent relationship recognized by him than to the physician-patient relationship
which he rejected. See supra note 34.
"[Tihe psychotherapeutic relationship not only satisfies [Dean Wigmore's four crite-
ria] but satisfies them better than any existing privileged relationship." Fisher, The Psy-
chotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L.
REV. 609, 611 (1974).
48. See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 639 (6th Cir. 1983); Caesar v. Mountanos, 542
F.2d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1976), Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 575 (E.D.N.Y.
1977); See also FED. R. EVID. 504 advisory committee note (proposed 1972). But see
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federal courts, however, have not been uniform in their recogni-
tion of the privilege. Acting in accordance with their own inter-
pretation of the standards (or lack thereof) provided in Federal
Rule of Evidence 501, individual federal courts have reached in-
consistent and often conflicting results. 9
C. Federal Rule of Evidence 501
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 establishes a single, general
privilege governing the admissibility of confidential communica-
tions in the federal courts.5 0  This single, general rule was
adopted by Congress in 1972 in preference to nine individual
and specific rules which were originally proposed by the Advi-
sory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence."' Among the
United States v. Witt, 542 F. Supp. 696, 698 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.
1982) (declining to recognize a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege in case involving
prosecution for illegal distribution of controlled substances).
Once one accepts the psychotherapist-patient privilege, numerous unanswered ques-
tions arise. Who may claim the privilege? What type of therapist qualifies for the privi-
lege? What type of communications should be granted privileged status? What limits
must be placed on the general privilege rule? For a discussion of these issues see Note,
The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege - The Sixth Circuit Does the Decent Thing: In
re Zuniga, 33 KAN. L. REv. 385, 399 (1985).
49. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statu-
tory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element
of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privi-
lege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be determined in accordance with State law.
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 337 F. Supp. 1114, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (hold-
ing that a psychotherapist-patient privilege, if one exists, is merely a form of doctor-
patient privilege and, therefore, does not apply in federal court absent a specific statute);
United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1167-68 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege does not exist using reasoning identical to that in Wil-
liams); Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983) (recognizing federal psychotherapist-patient
privilege in application of Federal Rule of Evidence 501). See also infra notes 60-130 and
accompanying text.
50. See statute cited supra note 49.
51. Rules of Evidence for Federal Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). The
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence was appointed by Chief Justice Earl War-
ren on March 8, 1965, and assigned the task of developing uniform rules of evidence for
use in the federal courts. The committee, made up of judges, attorneys and educators,
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nine rules was a specific privilege protecting communications be-
tween patients and psychotherapists. 5 2
Legislative history reveals two distinct motivations for the
enactment of a single, general provision instead of the originally
proposed, more specific rules. First, the enactment of the general
rule permitted greater interpretive flexibility in the courts for
examining what may be outmoded social policy.53 This view,
echoed by the Sixth Circuit in In re Zuniga,54 draws support
from language contained in the Senate Judiciary Committee Re-
port to Rule 501, which disclaims any intention of foreclosing
recognition of the nine privileges enumerated in the originally
completed a preliminary draft of proposed rules in March, 1969. The draft was accompa-
nied by detailed Advisory Committee notes. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7052.
The originally proposed rules included privileges for required reports privileged by
statute (FED. R. EvID. 502 (proposed 1972)): lawyer-client privilege (FED. R. EvID. 503
(proposed 1972)); psychotherapist-patient privilege (FED. R. EVID. 504 (proposed 1972));
husband-wife privilege (FED. R. Evio. 505 (proposed 1972)); communications to clergymen
(Fed. R. Evid. 506 (proposed 1972)); political vote privileges (FED. R. EVID. 507 (proposed
1972)); trade secret privileges (FED. R. EVID. 508 (proposed 1972)); secrets of state and
other official information privileges (FED. R. EvID. 509 (proposed 1972)); and privileges
regarding the identity of informers (FED. R. EVID. 510 (proposed 1972)).
Although these rules are commonly attributed to the Supreme Court, Justice Doug-
las pointed out in his dissent to the order prescribing the proposed rules that the Court
did not write, supervise the writing of, or rule on the merits of the rules. The rules were
the culmination of seven years work by an advisory committee, appointed by Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren. The Court was merely a conduit for transmission of the proposed rules
to Congress. Justice Douglas did not, however, deny the Court's approval of the Rules.
"[T]he public assumes that our imprimatur is on the Rules, as of course it is." Rules of
Evidence for Federal Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 185 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
52. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504 provides in part:
(b) General rule of privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications, made
for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his mental or emotional condition,
including drug addiction, among himself, his psychotherapist, or persons who are
participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the psychothera-
pist, including members of the patient's family.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient,
by his guardian or conservator, or by the personal representative of a deceased
patient. The person who was the psychotherapist may claim the privilege but only
on behalf of the patient. His authority to do so is presumed in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.
FED. R. EvID. 504 (proposed 1972).
53. See infra note 55.
54. Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 636.
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proposed rules. 5 5
A second, more cynical rationale suggests that Congress
merely conveyed to the courts the distasteful responsibility for a
volatile decision that it was having trouble making.56 Substantial
controversy surrounded congressional consideration of the
adoption of the proposed rules on privilege. This controversy
threatened the passage of the entire set of federal rules. It has,
therefore, been suggested that this threat actually prompted
Congress' decision to compromise and adopt the present Rule
501.57
Regardless of the reasons, the federal courts have retained
dominion over decisions regarding all evidentiary privileges.
When faced with a claim of privilege, individual courts are free
to recognize and apply the privilege in light of their interpreta-
tion of the facts of each case and of "reason and experience.""
On the question of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, results
have been diverse and often inconsistent."
55. The Senate Report states, in part:
It should be clearly understood that, in approving this general rule as to privi-
leges, the action of Congress should not be understood as disapproving any recog-
nition of a psychiatrist-patient, or husband-wife, or any other enumerated privi-
leges contained in the Supreme Court's rules. Rather, our action should be
understood as reflecting the view that a recognition of privilege based on a confi-
dential relationship and other privileges should be determined on a case-by-case
basis.
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7051, 7059.
56. In a special note on the laws of privilege, the Senate Report stated:
From the outset, it was clear that the context of the proposed privilege provi-
sions was extremely contraversial [sic]. Since it was clear that no agreement was
likely.., the determination was made that the specific privilege rules proposed by
the Court would be eliminated . . . leaving the law . . . to be developed by the
courts of the United States utilizing principles of the common law.
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7051, 7053.
57. For a detailed discussion of the controversy surrounding the passage of the priv-
ilege section of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Comment, Evidence Law - The Psy-
chotherapist-Patient Privilege in Federal Courts, 59 NoTm DAME L. REV. 791, 801-10
(1984).
58. See FED. R. EVD. 501, supra note 50.




D. Judicial Treatment of the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege
1. Federal Court
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 requires that the law of privi-
lege be governed by the principles of common law as interpreted
in the light of "reason and experience." A minority of courts
align themselves strictly with the common law, refusing to recog-
nize any psychotherapist-patient privilege whatsoever.6 0 These
decisions fail to appreciate the inherent differences in the physi-
cian-patient and psychotherapist-patient relationships.61 Fur-
thermore, they fail to recognize that in enacting Federal Rule of
Evidence 501, Congress had no intention of ending the evolution
of privilege law or of unremittedly returning to the common
law.62
Deciding whether a psychotherapist-patient privilege indeed
exists, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York, in Lora v. Board of Education, considered factors
other than the nonexistence of the privilege at common law.63
In Lora, plaintiffs were black and Hispanic children as-
signed to Special Day Schools for Socially Maladjusted and
Emotionally Disturbed Children (SMED schools). They main-
tained that standards for identification, evaluation and place-
ment of students into SMED schools were vague, ambiguous,
overbroad and applied in a capricious, arbitrary and racially dis-
criminatory manner.6 To prove their claims, plaintiffs sought
pretrial disclosure of fifty randomly selected and redacted diag-
nostic and referral files.6" Defendant sought protection against
60. See supra note 49. See also United States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520, 525 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) (interpreting Federal Rule 501 as adhering strictly to the common law, and,
therefore, holding that a psychologist-patient privilege does not exist in federal courts).
61. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
63. Lora, 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
64. Id. at 568.
65. The material contained in the diagnostic and referral files was the product of
procedures designed to identify emotionally disabled students who may have qualified
for placement into SMED schools. When a teacher or school administrator noted that a
pupil manifested maladaptive, disruptive, or aggressive behavior, the child was referred
to the school guidance counselor who determined whether a detailed psychological as-
sessment was warranted. If so, the counselor assembled all data pertinent to the case




compelled production of the documents asserting, inter alia, that
the materials were protected by the federal psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege and therefore immune from discovery." Inter-
preting Federal Rule of Evidence 501 as requiring a balancing of
interests for and against application of a specific evidentiary
privilege,6 7 the Lora court acknowledged the inherent differences
in the physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient relation-
ships and the substantial societal interest in fostering the lat-
ter.68 This societal interest, coupled with the interests of the in-
dividual students in protecting their privacy,69 was weighed
against two factors: the general need for all relevant evidence in
litigation and the specific need in this case, in which the quality
of remedial education of emotionally disturbed children was at
issue.70
The Lora court concluded that under the facts of this case,
the balance tipped on the side of compelled disclosure. The
court granted plaintiffs motion for an order compelling produc-
tion of redacted portions of the fifty student files. 71 Protective
clinics, hospitals and social agencies. This data was screened by a registered psychologist
or registered social worker who determined if placement in a SMED school was indi-
cated. If it was so determined, a three-part evaluative study was conducted including a
psychological examination of the pupil, a casework study of the family by a social worker
and a psychiatric consultation or examination. All materials collected during evaluation
and diagnosis were maintained in the students' files.
In making their pretrial discovery motion, plaintiffs sought to have the randomly
selected files examined by experts so as to determine if the referral process was carried
out in a racially discriminatory fashion. Id. at 568.
66. Id. at 569.
67. "The granting or withholding of any privilege requires a balancing of competing
policies." Id. at 578 (quoting Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 1970)).
68. Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 574-76.
69. Id. at 578. The privacy interests of the individual students were deemed to be
substantially reduced since their identities were effectively masked and the records to be
released were to be further protected against unnecessary disclosure by protective court
order. See infra note 72.
70. Id. at 579. Four significant factors were identified by the Lora court to be used
in determining whether disclosure of the records would unreasonably interfere with the
privacy expectations of the students and their families:
First, is the identification of the individuals required for effective use of the data?
Second, is the invasion of privacy and risk of psychological harm being limited to
the narrowest possible extent? Third, will the data have been supplied only to
qualified personnel under strict controls over confidentiality? Fourth, is the data
necessary or simply desirable?
71. Id. at 587.
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orders, designed to protect the privacy of the students whose
records were produced, were also issued.
In 1983, the Sixth Circuit in Zuniga7 3 engaged in a similar
analysis in adjudicating a refusal on the part of psychiatrists to
comply with subpoenas duces tecum issued pursuant to a grand
jury investigation of fraudulent billing practices. 74 The psychia-
trists argued, inter alia, that the documents sought by the grand
jury75 were protected from disclosure by the psychiatrist-patient
privilege.71 In determining whether federal law recognized a psy-
chiatrist-patient privilege, the court looked to Federal Rule of
Evidence 501 and its legislative history, noting that the congres-
sional decision not to enact proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
504, a specific psychotherapist-patient privilege, 77 "[did] not
preclude recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege" in
the federal courts. 8
Indeed, the Zuniga court recognized the unique relationship
which exists between a psychotherapist and patient and deliber-
ately avoided equating psychotherapists with other physicians. 79
The court then performed a balancing test, weighing the societal
interest in the availability of evidence in criminal proceedings
72. In addition to requiring that all identifying data included in the files be re-
dacted, the court ordered that the information contained in the files be used solely for
the purpose of the impending litigation; that the number of copies to be made of the
documents be rigidly regulated; that files submitted to the court be sealed; that all mate-
rial must be returned to the defendants upon conclusion of the suit; and that strict confi-
dentiality be enforced under penalty of contempt of court. Id. at 582-83, 587.
73. Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 632.
74. Id. at 636.
75. The grand jury subpoena ordered production of patient appointment books,
sign-in sheets, the doctor's daily log book, redacted copies of patient files (indicating
patient name, date of treatment and type of therapy rendered), original patient ledger
cards and any other forms, records or memoranda supporting the services rendered. Id.
at 638.
76. Id. at 636.
77. See also supra notes 52-57.
78. Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 637.
79. Id. at 638. The court cited a number of cases in which the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege was not recognized: United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir.
1982); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Witt, 542
F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The Zuniga court noted that in these cases, the courts
simply equated the psychotherapist-patient privilege with the physician-patient privi-
lege, without analyzing the unique aspects of the psychotherapeutic relationship. As




against the interests promoted by recognition of the privilege.8
The court found that the latter interests "in general outweigh
the need for evidence in the administration of criminal justice"'"
and that recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
under the facts of the case, was "mandated by reason and
experience. 82
Having acknowledged the "compelling necessity" for the ex-
istence of the privilege, the court noted that, "Just as the recog-
nition of privileges must be taken on a case-by-case basis, so too
must the scope of the privilege be considered."83 In determining
the scope of the privilege, the court performed a second balanc-
ing test, weighing the degree of intrusion into privacy affected
by the release of the psychiatrists' files against the need for ef-
fective criminal investigation.8 4 As the information actually
sought by the grand jury in this case was limited,85 and pro-
tected from further unnecessary disclosure by the veil of secrecy
attending grand jury proceedings, 86 the court characterized the
intrusion into the privacy interests of the psychiatric patients as
80. Describing the interests promoted by recognition of privilege as "extensive," the
court noted:
The inability to obtain effective psychiatric treatment may preclude the enjoy-
ment and exercise of many fundamental freedoms, particularly those protected by
the First Amendment .... The interest of the patient in exercising his rights is
also society's interest, for society benefits from its members active enjoyment of
their freedom. Moreover, society has an interest in successful treatment of mental
illness because of the possibility that a mentally ill person will pose a danger to
the community.
Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639.
81. Id.
82. Id. In making its determination, the court took into account the demonstrated
willingness of individual states to recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See
supra note 35. The court also considered as determinative the support for such recogni-
tion found in the Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504
and the support for such recognition provided by various other commentators. Id. at
636-39.
83. Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639.
84. Id. at 639-41.
85. The subpoenas at issue sought only the names of patients, the dates of treat-
ment and the length of office visits. Documents containing patient's confidential commu-
nications or the psychotherapist's confidential notations were not sought by the grand
jury subpoena. The identities of patients involved were already known to the grand jury.
Id. at 642.
86. Id. By law, grand jury proceedings are secret and any breach of that secrecy is a




"minimal. 8 7 Disclosure was therefore ordered "only to the mini-
mal extent necessary to promote a proper government
interest."'8
The Zuniga court provided no specific guidelines as to the
proper scope of disclosure which qualifies as the "minimal ex-
tent necessary." One factor delineated by the court as prominent
in such an analysis was the existence of safeguards designed to
prevent unnecessary dissemination of the materials subpoe-
naed. 9 This factor has been deemed important in a number of
federal cases considering compelled disclosure of ostensibly pri-
vate records."0
2. State Court
Decisions of state courts considering claims of privilege re-
garding the disclosure of psychiatric records also have been va-
ried in their approach to the issues and have often yielded in-
consistent results.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Rhode Island, in In re
Grand Jury Investigation,s1 considered two physicians' attempts
to quash subpoenas duces tecum issued by a grand jury pursu-
ant to an investigation of suspected Medicaid fraud.92 The phy-
sicians argued that the state's physician-patient privilege93 pro-
tected their medical records against compelled disclosure and
87. Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 642.
88. Id.
89. The court did not delineate what safeguards were to be utilized to protect the
confidential data from unnecessary disclosure. The court merely ordered that "the infor-
mation will be disclosed only to the minimal extent necessary to promote a proper gov-
ernmental interest and will not be subject to widespread dissemination." Id.
The Zuniga court also did not decide what safeguards would be appropriate should
the grand jury investigation lead to a criminal prosecution in which the government
would seek to introduce the doctors' records into evidence. Id. at 642 n.11.
90. See, e.g., In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261, 264 (7th Cir. 1983) (The psychothera-
pist opposed a grand jury subpoena for patient records pursuant to the investigation of
criminal billing fraud upon insurance companies. The court compelled production, em-
phasizing that access to the patient records would be strictly restricted thereby preserv-
ing the confidentiality of the records.). See also Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 582; United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714 (1973); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 601-02 (1976).
91. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 441 A.2d 525 (R.I. 1982).
92. Id. at 527.





therefore the records were not discoverable by a grand jury.9 4
The Rhode Island court noted that, "A reading of the fed-
eral Medicaid laws . . . discloses a clear congressional intention
that the patient records kept by health-care providers be subject
to disclosure during fraud investigations."96 As such, the state
statutory physician-patient privilege, if given effect, would stand
"as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." ' Thus, the court held
that based upon the supremacy clause of the United States Con-
stitution,97 federal law must prevail and the medical records at
issue were obtainable by the grand jury.98 In a similar case, the
New York Court of Appeals, in Camperlengo v. Blum,"e consid-
ered a claim that the state statutory physician-patient privi-
lege 0 ' protected medical records from compelled disclosure in a
Medicaid fraud proceeding. In Camperlengo, however, the
records at issue were psychiatric files which included "all patient
records including, but not limited to treatment plans, periodic
evaluations and other treatment or diagnostic or prognostic
records."''1 1 The Camperlengo court held that the federal and
state Medicaid recordkeeping and reporting statutes "evidence a
clear intention to abrogate the physician-patient privilege to the
extent necessary to satisfy the important public interest in see-
ing that Medicaid funds are properly applied."'10 2
94. Grand Jury Investigation, 441 A.2d at 527.
95. Id. at 529.
96. Id. at 528 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977)).
97. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
98. Grand Jury Investigation, 441 A.2d at 527.
99. 56 N.Y.2d 251, 436 N.E.2d 1299, 451 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1982).
100. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. R. 4504 (McKinney 1981) (current version at N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R.
4504 (McKinney 1986)).
101. Camperlengo, 56 N.Y.2d at 254, 436 N.E.2d at 1300, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
102. Camperlengo, 56 N.Y.2d at 255-56, 436 N.E.2d at 1301, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 698-99.
A similar result was effected in the State of Washington. State Dep't of Social & Health
Servs. v. Latta, 92 Wash. 2d 812, 601 P.2d 520 (1979). In Latta, administrative subpoe-
nas for the full records of Medicaid patients were served on a medical clinic and two
pathologists. They asserted the state's statutory physician-patient privilege, arguing that
the subpoenaed records were privileged communications. The court ruled the privilege
inapplicable to Medicaid investigations but did not do so along strict pre-emption
grounds. It was held that "[tihe privilege is a procedural safeguard, not a rule of substan-
tive or constitutional law; therefore, its application turns on the language and interpreta-
tion of the statute." Latta, 92 Wash. 2d at 812, 601 P.2d at 525. As the purpose of the
statute was to prevent public disclosure, this purpose was not violated by releasing the
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The petitioner in Camperlengo also argued that the infor-
mation sought by the government was protected by the right of
privacy embodied in the Constitution. 103 Because this claim was
not raised in the lower courts, however, it was not considered on
appeal.104 In holding that the statutory Medicaid reporting re-
quirements constituted an exception to the state's physician-pa-
tient privilege, the court noted that the exception was "to be no
broader than necessary for effective oversight of the Medicaid
program."10 5 The Camperlengo court had "no occasion to deline-
ate the precise boundaries of the exception" as the petitioner
had abandoned in his appeal any claim that the subpoena was
overly broad. 06
Such an occasion did present itself to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Kobrin.10 7 This
case involved a psychiatrist's challenge to a grand jury subpoena
for selected Medicaid patient records. The subpoenas, which
called for the surrendering of full patient files, were issued pur-
suant to an investigation of suspected billing fraud. s08 Dr.
Kobrin challenged the subpoenas, claiming protection under
both the state's statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege'0 9
and the constitutionally protected right of privacy.1 0 Consistent
ostensibly privileged information to the Department of Health and Social Services which
was required under Medicaid to monitor provider services. Latta, 92 Wash. 2d at 812,
601 P.2d at 525.
103. Camperlengo, 56 N.Y.2d at 256, 436 N.E.2d at 1301, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 256 n.*, 436 N.E.2d at 1301 n.*, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 595 n.*.
107. 395 Mass. 284, 479 N.E.2d 674 (1985).
108. Id. at 285-88, 479 N.E.2d at 676-77.
109. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B (West 1984) (current version at MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B (West 1986)).
110. Psychotherapists have generally been granted standing to assert the privacy
interests of their patients. See Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y, Dist. Branch of the Am. Psychi-
atric Ass'n v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1037 (D. Hawaii 1979); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 682 (1977).
The Kobrin court did not reach the constitutional privacy issue. Because the psy-
chotherapeutic communications were already protected against disclosure by state privi-
lege law, the court held that adjudication of the privacy issue was unnecessary. Kobrin,
395 Mass. at 288 n.9, 479 N.E.2d at 678 n.9.
See generally In re B, 482 Pa. 471, 477, 394 A.2d 419, 421-22 (1978) ("Ordinarily,
when faced with an issue raising both constitutional and non-constitutional questions,
[courts] will make a determination on non-constitutional grounds and avoid the constitu-
tional issue if possible.").
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/4
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with the approach taken by federal courts, the Kobrin court uti-
lized a balancing approach in evaluating the applicability and
scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The federal pol-
icy requiring disclosure of records to facilitate the investigation
and prosecution of Medicaid fraud, 1 ' which the court described
as "very necessary to the continued viability of the Medicaid
program,""' 2 was weighed against the "justifiable expectations of
confidentiality that most individuals seeking psychotherapeutic
treatment harbor." ' s Finding the state interest "compelling,"'" 4
the court held that the arguments for and against disclosure of
the records were not mutually repugnant, but both could be ac-
commodated." 5 The court ordered that those portions of Dr.
Kobrin's records which were actually "necessary to fully disclose
the extent of the services provided" were to be produced."'
111. This policy is delineated in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(27) (1982) and 42 C.F.R. §
431.107(b)(1985). The applicable Massachusetts statute requires that all Medicaid prov-
iders "maintain proof, subject to audit of the actual deliverance of services and goods to
recipients for which bills are submitted." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E, § 20 (West
1985).
112. Kobrin, 395 Mass. at 290, 479 N.E.2d at 679 (quoting In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation, 441 A.2d at 531).
113. Kobrin, 395 Mass. at 290, 479 N.E.2d at 679.
114. Id. (quoting Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. at 1041).
115. Kobrin, 395 Mass. at 290, 479 N.E.2d at 679.
116. Id. at 291, 479 N.E.2d at 679 (emphasis omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(27)(1982)). Dr. Kobrin was ordered to produce those portions of his records
documenting the identity of the patients, the times and length of appointments, fees,
diagnoses, treatment plans and somatic therapies. Kobrin, 395 Mass. at 284, 479 N.E.2d
at 676.
It has been argued that protecting confidential communications alone is insufficient
and that the mere identity of psychiatric patients must be privileged so as to maintain
an effective psychotherapist-patient relationship. Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 640. See also Lora,
74 F.R.D. at 580.
Commenting on this, Professor Weinstein has written:
While it can perhaps be said that a client does not ordinarily wish to keep
secret the fact that he has consulted a lawyer, the reverse is undoubtedly true in
the case of psychotherapy. Some psychiatrists' offices, unlike lawyers, have sepa-
rate entrances and exits so that a patient can leave without being seen. Non-divul-
gence of a patient's identity may be essential for maintaining the psychotherapist-
patient relationship .... Even when suppression of a patient's identity would re-
sult in the loss of evidence of criminal conduct, the potential destruction of the
therapeutic relationship is of greater concern.
2 J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE § 504, at 504-23 (1985).
The stigma commonly associated with those who receive psychiatric treatment cer-
tainly lends support to Weinstein's position. In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), the
Supreme Court discussed this social stigma in a case concerning the constitutional re-
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Those portions of the records which reflected patients' thoughts,
feelings, impressions or which contained the substance of thera-
peutic dialogue were held to be protected from compelled dis-
closure.1 7 Although the Kobrin court did not reach the constitu-
tional privacy issue,1"' the court did consider the privacy
concerns underlying the state's psychotherapist-patient priv-
ilege. '
In 1970, the State of California took this acknowledgement
of underlying privacy concerns in privilege statutes one step fur-
quirements for voluntary admissions of minors to psychiatric hospitals stating: "The pat-
tern of untreated, abnormal behavior - even if nondangerous - arouses at least as
much negative reaction as treatment that becomes public knowledge. A person needing,
but not receiving, appropriate medical care may well face even greater social ostracism
resulting from the observable symptoms of an untreated disorder." Id. at 601.
Commenting on this observation by the majority, Justice Stewart wrote: "The fact
that such a stigma may be unjustified does not mean it does not exist.... The aberrant
behavior may disappear while the fact of past institutionalization lasts forever." Id. at
622 n.3 (Stewart, J., concurring).
This stigma can affect an individual's employment opportunities. One need only ex-
amine the career of Thomas Eagleton who, upon the disclosure of his treatment for de-
pression, was dropped by George McGovern as vice-presidential candidate. See N.Y.
Times, Aug. 1, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 8. See also Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078,
1089 (E.D. Wis. 1972) ("Evidence is plentiful that a former mental patient will encounter
serious obstacles in attempting to find a job.").
The Zuniga court acknowledged that "[tihis consideration is not insubstantial." 714
F.2d at 640. However, because "the interest of society in obtaining all evidence relevant
to the enforcement of its laws commands a high priority," the balance must tip in favor
of disclosure. Id.
The essential element of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is its assurance
to the patient that his innermost thoughts may be revealed without fear of dis-
closure. Mere disclosure of the patient's identity does not negate this element.
Thus, the Court [sic] concluded that, as a general rule, the identity of a patient or
the fact and time of his treatment does not fall within the scope of the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege.
Id.
The Zuniga court added that this holding does not mean that a court, at its discre-
tion or compelled by considerations of constitutional privacy, could not protect the iden-
tities of patients. 714 F.2d at n.7.
117. Kobrin, 395 Mass. 295, 479 N.E.2d at 682. See generally Pebsworth, 705 F.2d
at 262 ("Fragmentary data" such as names, appointment dates and, in some cases, diag-
noses, were distinguished from detailed psychological profiles of patients or substantive
accounts of therapy sessions.).
118. See supra note 110.
119. The Kobrin court noted that in enacting the state's psychotherapist-patient
privilege, the Massachusetts legislature acknowledged that most individuals seeking psy-




ther and became the first jurisdiction to recognize a constitu-
tionally based psychotherapist-patient privilege. 20 In In re Lif-
schutz, 2I one of Dr. Lifschutz's patients, Joseph Housek, filed a
damage suit against the defendant, John Arabian, for assault.
Housek's complaint alleged that the assault caused, in addition
to physical injuries, "severe mental and emotional distress. "122
Dr. Lifschutz, who had been identified by the plaintiff in a depo-
sition, had treated the plaintiff for a six-month period approxi-
mately ten years earlier. The defendant then subpoenaed for
deposition Dr. Lifschutz and all of his medical records relating
to the treatment of Housek.' 3
Although Dr. Lifschutz appeared for the deposition, he re-
fused to answer questions relating to his treatment of the plain-
tiff and refused to produce any of his medical records.1 24 The
psychiatrist was held in contempt of court and ultimately placed
in custody for disobeying a court order to divulge the requested
information.125  Arguing against compelled disclosure of his
records or testimony, Dr. Lifschutz, inter alia, relied upon the
California statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege.' The
state, however, relying upon the patient-litigant exception to the
privilege statute, 2 7 claimed that since the plaintiff, in instituting
120. Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1-4
(1980).
121. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
122. Id. at 420, 467 P.2d at 559, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
123. Id.
124. Dr. Lifschutz refused even to disclose whether or not Housek had ever con-
sulted him or had been his patient.
125. Id.
126. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1014 (West 1969) (current version at CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014
(West 1986)). The code provides, in part:
Except as otherwise provided in this article, the patient, whether or not a party,
has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a
confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist if the privilege
is claimed by:
(a) The holder of the privilege;
(b) A person who is authorized to claim the privilege by the holder of the
privilege.
Id.
Although notified, neither plaintiff Housek, nor his attorney attended the deposition
of Dr. Lifschutz nor did they appear in any of the hearings related to the contempt
citation of the psychiatrist. Housek neither claimed a psychotherapist-patient privilege
nor expressly waived such a privilege.




the litigation, had raised his psychological condition as an issue,
the statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege was
inapplicable. 128
The California Supreme Court affirmed the lower court or-
der requiring the production of records and the answering of
questions by Dr. Lifschutz. The doctor's contempt citation for
intentionally violating the valid court order was affirmed. 29 In
so doing, however, the California court recognized a constitu-
tional basis for the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
We believe that a patient's interest in keeping such confidential
revelations from public purview, in retaining this substantial pri-
vacy, has deeper roots than the California statute and draws sus-
tenance from our constitutional heritage. In Griswold v. Connect-
icut, the United States Supreme Court declared that '[v]arious
guarantees [of the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy,' and we
believe that the confidentiality of the psychotherapeutic session
falls within one such zone.130
While this statement by the California court was dictum, it
struck a responsive chord in a number of jurisdictions. " ' Most
(West 1986)). The code provided:
There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant to an
issue concerning the mental or emotional condition of the patient if such issue has
been tendered by:
(a) The patient;
(b) Any party claiming through or under the patient;
(c) Any party claiming as a beneficiary of the patient through a contract to
which the patient is or was a party; or
(d) The plaintiff in an action brought.., for damages for the injury or death
of the patient.
128. Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 433, 467 P.2d at 569, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 830. Two distinct
grounds have been identified by the courts in support of the patient-litigant exception to
the physician-patient privilege.
First ...the patient, in raising the issue of a specific ailment or condition in
litigation, in effect dispenses with the confidentiality of that ailment and may no
longer justifiably seek protection from the humiliation of its exposure. Second ....
in all fairness, a patient should not be permitted to establish a claim while simul-
taneously foreclosing inquiry into relevant matters.
Id. See generally 4 J. WIGMoRE, EvIDENCE § 2389 at 836-40 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1977).
129. Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 439, 467 P.2d at 573, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
130. Id. at 431-32, 467 P.2d at 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (quoting Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)).
131. See, e.g., Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067-69 (9th Cir. 1976) (discuss-
ing at length the privacy-based privilege identified in Lifschutz); Robinson v. Magovern,




of those courts that have examined the constitutional aspects of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege have acknowledged that
the right of non-disclosure is not absolute. Certain exceptions to
the privilege have been deemed acceptable within the constitu-
tional framework.1 32 In addition to the patient-litigant exception
seen in Lifschutz, it has been held that a compelling state inter-
est may also justify interference with the privilege. 133
Analogous to the patient-litigant exception to the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege is the exception for communications
made by patients expecting disclosure to third parties. 34 In In
re Pebsworth,13 5 the Seventh Circuit addressed whether pa-
tients' authorizations for disclosure of their treatment to Blue
Cross-Blue Shield constituted a waiver of the state's psychother-
apist-patient privilege with regard to information sought by the
government pursuant to an investigation of billing fraud. 3 The
court ruled that by assenting to publicize their records through
the Blue Cross-Blue Shield reimbursement claims procedure, the
privacy" protecting the doctor-patient relationship); Miller v. Colonial Refrigerated
Transp. Inc., 81 F.R.D. 741, 744-46 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (acknowledging existence of consti-
tutional privilege against disclosure of psychotherapeutic communications); Lora, 74
F.R.D. at 569-74. But see Felber v. Foote, 321 F. Supp. 85, 87 (D. Conn. 1970) (holding
that there exists no constitutional foundation for the "cloak of confidentiality" which
gives a patient the privilege to exclude psychotherapeutic communications from judicial
proceedings).
132. Caesar, 542 F.2d at 1067. (Psychiatrist contended that the constitutional right
of privacy must be construed to provide an absolute privilege for psychotherapeutic com-
munications. The court acknowledged that the right relied upon is substantial. "How-
ever, the right is conditional rather than absolute and limited impairment of that right
may be allowed if properly justified.") Id.
133. Id. at 1067-70. See also Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551
P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (A psychotherapist has a duty to warn potential vic-
tims of dangerous patients notwithstanding psychotherapist-patient confidentiality re-
quirements or privileges.).134. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504(a)(3) stated that "A communication is
'confidential' if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those present to
further the interest of the patient.., or those who are participating in the diagnosis and
treatment ...." Rules of Evidence for United States Court and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D.
183, 241 (1972).
135. Pebsworth, 705 F.2d at 262.
136. The psychotherapist, Dr. Anita, was accused of fraudulently obtaining reim-
bursement from medical insurance companies through submission of false psychiatric
patient care records. Subpoenas were issued to Mr. Pebsworth, as the authorized repre-
sentative of Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Illinois, commanding the production of all records
concerning Dr. Anita including, inter alia, the names of patients, a listing of their visits,




patients had knowingly and intentionally relinquished any privi-
lege they may have had.13 7
For such a waiver to be effective, it must be an "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege."' 8 In the Medicaid program, therefore, a waiver of the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege could only be effective to the ex-
tent that the Medicaid patient could be expected to know that
particular records were subject to disclosure as a result of the
waiver. The State of Hawaii requires that such a waiver be exe-
cuted by all psychiatric patients enrolled in the state's Medicaid
program.3 9 This waiver was held to be quite limited in effect.
[I]t would be unreasonable to hold that an indigent patient who
signs a form stating that a provider may release certain medical
records to the state exercises a knowing waiver of his interest in
not having his most personal confidences to the psychiatrist dis-
closed. It is far more likely that, if he reads the form at all, a
patient would assume that the records would include only billing
information and similar non-confidential matters. 4 '
The determination of the validity of such a waiver would
require a case-by-case inquiry into the need for the particular
records, as well as the patient's reasonable expectation of the
nature of the privilege forfeited.' 4 In this regard, it is unlikely
that psychiatric patients would, at the commencement of treat-
ment, reasonably believe that they were waiving the confidenti-
ality of their communications by executing an insurance claim
form.
142
137. Id. at 264. The Pebsworth court, however, noted:
While we might well have decided differently if the information sought under the
subpoena involved detailed psychological profiles of patients or substantive ac-
counts of therapy sessions, it cannot be said that the subsequent disclosure of
such fragmentary data as is involved here.., would be beyond the contemplation
of the patients' waiver.
Id. at 263.
The Sixth Circuit in Zuniga adopted this waiver analysis and ruled that even if the
identities and times of treatment were within the scope of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, the patient had waived the privilege to the extent of his disclosure of that
information on his insurance form. 714 F.2d at 640-41.
138. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See Pebsworth, 705 F.2d at 262.
139. See Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. at 1045.
140. Id.
141. See Pebsworth, 714 F.2d at 262-63.




Thus, in the context of Medicaid fraud investigations, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege has been found to afford only
limited, if any, protection against compelled disclosure of psy-
chiatric records. 143 Although the claims of privilege have occa-
sionally been successful in protecting records containing confi-
dential therapeutic communications, the privilege has not been
extended to protect those records, disclosure of which poses a
lesser threat to patients' privacy interests. 144 An element often
determinative in courts' considerations of privilege claims is the
existence of protections against unnecessary disclosure of private
information.'" The presence of such safeguards weighs heavily
in favor of disclosure when courts' decisions turn on a balancing
of the degree of intrusion into individual privacy interests
against the state interest in obtaining evidence in criminal
cases.146
III. Constitutional Privacy
A. Historical Origin of The Right
The concept of a common law right of privacy developed in
a large part from two key law review articles. The seminal arti-
cle, written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890, at-
tacked the increased intrusion by the press into private lives and
urged the preservation of each individual's "inviolate personal-
ity.' 47 According to Brandeis and Warren, "[t]he common law
lege is valuable, it is unsound to deny it to a person merely because he is too poor to
afford a private physician or private hospital." 5 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER,
N.Y. CIv. PRAc., § 4504.12 at 45-217 (1985). In Pebsworth, it was argued that the court,
by holding that a person's assent to the publicizing aspect of reimbursement and claims
procedures, forced patients to make the "unconscionable Hobson's choice of either re-
ceiving no treatment or receiving treatment only at the cost of making public their ill-
ness." 714 F.2d at 264.
In response to this, the court commented that the grand jury, other official investi-
gative bodies and trial courts "will take scrupulous measures to ensure that there occurs
no unnecessary disclosure of patients' names or diagnoses." Id.
In this regard, one may also argue that a "Medicaid exception" to the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege constitutes an impermissible classification based upon wealth and
thereby denies Medicaid patients equal protection under the law.
143. See supra notes 60-131 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 84-90, 131 and accompanying text.
147. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAuv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
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secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to
what extent his thoughts, sentiments and emotions shall be com-
municated to others.1 4
8
A second article dealing with the right of privacy was writ-
ten by Dean William L. Prosser in 1960.1"0 Dean Prosser pro-
vided a historical review of case law dealing with the right of
privacy dating back to the publication of the Warren and Bran-
deis article in 1890. Focusing on the common law of torts, Dean
Prosser indicated that what had emerged from this collection of
cases was a complex of four separate torts. He noted that "[tihe
law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four
different interests of the plaintiff . ". .. I" They are: an intrusion
into a person's private affairs;151 public disclosure of embaras-
sing private facts; 152 publicity which creates a false public im-
age; 53 and, appropriation of a person's name or likeness. 1 4
It was not until 1965 that the Supreme Court, in Griswold v.
Connecticut,'5 recognized a specific constitutional right of pri-
vacy. 156 In Griswold, the Court declared unconstitutional a Con-
necticut statute which forbade both the use of contraceptives
and the aiding or counselling of others in their use. 157 The ma-
148. Id. at 198. As a Justice of the Supreme Court, Brandeis recognized "the right to
be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
149. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
150. Id. at 389. Prosser indicated that these four torts are tied together by a com-
mon name only; otherwise they have "almost nothing in common except that each repre-
sents an interference with the right of the plaintiff. .. 'to be let alone.'" Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. Dean Prosser suggested that the leading case in this area is Melvin v. Reid,
in which the plaintiff was permitted recovery where defendant made a motion picture
based on the plaintiff's earlier life as a prostitute. The plaintiff had indeed been a prosti-
tute and the defendant in a sensational murder trial. After her acquittal, she changed
her name, abandoned her previous life and began a new life of "rectitude in respectable
society" among friends who were unaware of her earlier career. 112 Cal. App. Supp. 285,
297 P. 91 (Dist. Ct. 1931).
153. Prosser, supra note 149, at 389.
154. Id.
155. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
156. For a historical overview of the constitutional right of privacy see Smith, Con-
stitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1980).
157. 381 U.S. 484-85. The defendants in Griswold were the Executive Director of
the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and its medical director, a licensed phy-
sician. They were convicted of violating a Connecticut statute by providing married per-
sons with information and medical advice on how to prevent conception and, following a
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/4
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jority opinion, written by Justice Douglas, suggested that "spe-
cific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance .... Various guarantees create zones of privacy ....
The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees."1 58
Focusing on the rights of married couples to use contracep-
tion, the Court enumerated several reasons which compelled rec-
ognition of a constitutional right of privacy. These included: the
historical importance of marriage; 59 the private nature of the
marital relationship; 60 the private nature of the relationship be-
tween the married couple and their physician;' 6 ' and the belief
that governmental intrusion into the marital bedroom was
improper.162
B. Constitutional Protection of Medical Records
Privacy issues in the context of medical records were twice
examined by the Supreme Court in the late 1970's. In Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 6 the Court considered, inter alia, the
constitutionality of a Missouri statute which imposed certain re-
cordkeeping requirements on physicians and hospitals which
performed abortions. Holding that the statute did not violate
physical examination, prescribing a contraceptive device or material. On appeal, the de-
fendants contended that the statute as applied violated the fourteenth amendment. Id.
at 480.
158. The amendments named by Justice Douglas as contributing to the right of pri-
vacy include the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth. Concurring opinions by Justices
Goldberg, Harlan and White agreed with the majority's conclusion that the Connecticut
statute violated the right of privacy but could not agree whether the right emanated
from the penumbras of several constitutional guarantees, or from the ninth or fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 486-507.
159. Id. at 486.
160. Id. at 482.
161. Id.
162. Id. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court again recognized a constitutional right of
privacy, striking down a defendant's conviction for distributing contraceptives to unmar-
ried persons. "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original).




women's constitutional privacy rights,114 the Court placed great
emphasis on the fact that the statute did not actually preclude
women from making abortion decisions without governmental
interference. 165 The Court also emphasized that the statutory re-
cording requirement did not interfere with the physician-patient
relationship; that the records would be useful in maternal-child
health issues; and, that the recording requirements offered safe-
guards to protect the patient's privacy.1 60
In Whalen v. Roe, 67 the Supreme Court considered the con-
stitutionality of a New York statute which required the filing of
records with the State Health Department of all prescriptions
written for certain commonly abused medications.6 8 The peti-
tioners in Whalen based their objection to the statute on the
grounds that the reporting and recording of their use of certain
drugs violated their constitutional right of privacy.' 69 Reviewing
past privacy decisions, the Court determined that there existed
at least two specific components of the right of privacy: "the in-
dividual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and
. .. the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
decisions. 17 0
The Court found that the New York statute did not inter-
fere with either interest such as to violate the patients' constitu-
tional rights. 7 1 The Court based its holding on the fact that the
statute itself provided for security against public disclosure of
164. Id. at 81.
165. Id. In Danforth, the Supreme Court struck down statutory provisions requiring
unmarried women under age 18 to obtain consent as a prerequisite to obtaining an abor-
tion. Another provision that was found unconstitutional barred a married woman from
obtaining an abortion without her husband's written consent. The Court found that
these consent provisions unduly burdened the right to seek abortions by delegating to
another the authority to prevent the procedure. Id. at 67-75.
166. Id. at 80-81.
167. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
168. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3334, 3338 (McKinney 1976) (current version at N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3334, 3338 (McKinney 1986)).
169. Petitioners, including a group of patients regularly receiving controlled medica-
tions and prescribing physicians, claimed that the statute's patient identification provi-
sions invaded the doctor-patient relationship with "a needlessly broad sweep." Claiming
that the doctor-patient relationshp is one of the zones of privacy accorded constitutional
protection, petitioners sought enjoinment of the enforcement of the challenged provi-
sions. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 596.
170. Id. at 599-600.
171. Id. at 603-04.
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patient identities; 72 that the disclosures required were not
"meaningfully distinguishable" from those often required for
public health purposes;71 that the statute would not deter the
legitimate use of the drugs;17 4 and, that the statute did not strip
patients of their right to decide independently whether or not to
use the medications.7 7 Therefore, although the Supreme Court
acknowledged constitutionally based privacy interests in medical
records,' 7 the Court held that given sufficient protection against
unnecessary public disclosure, individual privacy interests may
be sacrificed in favor of compelling societal interests such as de-
terring drug abuse and protecting maternal health.
77
C. Constitutional Analysis
Although the exact boundaries of the "zones of privacy"
identified by the Supreme Court in Griswold remain largely un-
defined,17 8 the two strands of the right of privacy identified in
Whalen 7 9 do provide a foundation from which to initiate a con-
172. Id. at 601.
173. Id. at 602. Other examples of statutory reporting requirements relating to pub-
lic health included those dealing with venereal disease, child abuse, injuries from deadly
weapons and fetal death. Id. at n.29.
174. Id. at 603.
175. Id.
176. A perplexing aspect of the Whalen decision is the conflicting concurrences by
Justices Brennan and Stewart. Justice Brennan maintained that the New York statute
did indeed involve constitutionally protected interests in avoiding the disclosure of per-
sonal matters and, therefore, was subject to the compelling state interest test. Id. at 607
(Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart, however, made it clear that the Court's earlier decision in Griswold,
which first recognized a constitutionally based right of privacy, does "not recognize a
general interest in freedom from disclosure of private information." Id. at 609 (quoting
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring)). Justice
Stewart maintained that there is no general constitutional right of privacy but rather,
the protection of a person's general right of privacy is, like the protection of his life and
property, left to the law of the individual states. 429 U.S. at 607-09 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
177. Id. at 607 (Stewart, J., concurring).
178. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977).
179. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text. At least one commentator has
suggested that there are actually three distinct interests involved in the constitutional
right of privacy:
The concept of a constitutional right of privacy still remains largely undefined.
There are at least three facets that have been partially revealed, but their form
and shape remain to be fully ascertained. The first is the right of the individual to
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stitutional analysis. In the context of Medicaid fraud investiga-
tions, claims of constitutional privacy must be evaluated in ac-
cordance with both the right of independence in decision making
and the right of informational privacy.
1. Right of Autonomy In Decision Making
The element of the right of privacy most clearly recognized
by the courts is the right of autonomy, 180 that is, the right to
make decisions in areas of fundamental concern, free from un-
warranted governmental intrusion.' 8 Where fundamental rights
are concerned, state action which significantly interferes with
these rights may be justified only by a compelling state inter-
est.182 Such state action must be necessary to advance the com-
pelling state interest and must be narrowly drawn to express
only the legitimate governmental interest at stake. 1' s
a. Fundamental Interest
To invoke constitutional protection, the loss of the right of
autonomy must involve matters which are "'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' """' The Supreme
Court has recognized as fundamental an individual's interest in
making decisions free from unjustified governmental intrusion in
the areas of marriage, 8 procreation8,16 contraception, 187 family
be free in his private affairs from governmental surveillance and intrusion. The
second is the right of an individual not to have his private affairs made public by
the government. The third is the right of an individual to be free in action,
thought, experience, and belief from governmental compulsion.
Kurland, The Private I, U. oF Cm. MAG., Autumn 1976, 7 at 7-8 (emphasis in original).
180. See generally Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1 (1980).
181. Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y, Dist. Branch of the Am. Psychiatric Ass'n v.
Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 (D. Hawaii 1979).
182. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
183. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155.
184. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
185. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
186. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).




relationships 8 child rearing and education,' 89 and abortion.' 90
The Court has further noted that "the outer limits of this aspect
of privacy have not been marked by the Court."' 91
In Whalen,"'9 the Supreme Court implicitly placed decisions
regarding medical care within this constitutionally protected
zone of the right of autonomy.'9 3 While decisions regarding med-
ical care and physical health are of paramount personal interest,
the concern of an individual for his own mental and emotional
health is certainly equal to, if not greater than, his concern for
his physical well-being.' 4 Indeed, effective psychotherapy may
be as important to a person suffering from a mental illness as
the opportunity to obtain an abortion is to a woman experienc-
ing an unwanted pregnancy, or as the availability of contracep-
tion is to a person desiring to prevent an unwanted pregnancy. 19"
Mental illness, left untreated, disrupts thought, decision making
and cognition which inevitably results in an interference with
marriage, child rearing, family relationships and other aspects of
life which are fundamental and implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty.196
In concert with this view, the District Court of Hawaii in
Hawaii Psychiatric Society, District Branch of the American
Psychiatric Association v. Ariyoshi 97 held that, "No area could
be more deserving of [constitutional] protection than communi-
188. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
189. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
190. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113.
191. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684.
192. Whalen, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
193. Id. at 598-600. See Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. at 1038.
194. Smith, supra note 180, at 22.
195. Id.
196. Some level of mental health is necessary for the exercise of even the most basic
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. As noted in Rogers v. Okin, the ability to control
one's thoughts and coherently express oneself "is fundamental to our cherished right to
communicate and is entitled to comparable constitutional protection." 478 F. Supp.
1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979).
One might argue that interference with the effectiveness of one's psychotherapy and
therefore with one's mental health is in actuality an intrusion into an "essential" rather
than "fundamental" interest such that even a compelling state interest does not provide
adequate justification.




cations between a psychiatrist and his patient."'198 Ariyoshi, a
1979 case, involved an action brought by psychotherapists seek-
ing to enjoin the enforcement of a Hawaii statute which author-
ized the issuance of administrative inspection warrants to search
the offices and records of Medicaid providers. 99 Plaintiffs in
Ariyoshi argued that the Hawaii statute was unconstitutional on
its face in that it permitted an unwarranted intrusion into the
privacy rights of their patients.00
Holding that the constitutionally protected right of privacy
does indeed extend to an individual's liberty to make decisions
regarding psychiatric care without unjustified interference, 0 ' the
court stated: "An individual's decisions whether or not to seek
the aid of a psychiatrist, and whether or not to communicate
certain personal information to that psychiatrist, fall squarely
within the bounds of this 'cluster of constitutionally protected
choices.' "o202
Having recognized that the right to make decisions regard-
ing psychiatric care is indeed fundamental, and therefore pro-
tected under the constitutional right of privacy, 0 3 the Ariyoshi
court noted that the state's infringement of that right triggered
the compelling state interest test.20 4 "This court's inquiry, there-
fore, must be whether [the Hawaii statute] burdens the individ-
ual's liberty to make decisions regarding psychiatric care, and, if
so, whether the State has demonstrated that the statute repre-
sents the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling state
interest."205
198. Id. at 1038.
199. Id. at 1029. The issuance of inspection warrants was authorized pursuant to
1978 Hawaii Sess. Laws 105 (repealed 1981).
200. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. at 1035.
201. Id. at 1039.
202. Id. at 1038 (quoting Carey, 431 U.S. at 685).
203. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. at 1039. See also Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064,
1069 (9th Cir. 1976); Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 570-71 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); In
re B, 482 Pa. 471, 484, 394 A.2d 419, 425 (1978).





b. Significant Government Interference
A second prerequisite to invoking constitutional protection
under the right of autonomy is for government action to inter-
fere significantly with the ability of an individual to make deci-
sions concerning fundamental issues.20 6 Incidental or minor im-
pediments do not result in an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy. 01
State action which places a significant burden on the exer-
cise of the right of autonomy may be unconstitutional, even if
protected choices are not entirely foreclosed by that action.20 8 In
1977, the Supreme Court, in Carey v. Population Services Inter-
national,209 held that a New York statute, which limited to li-
censed pharmacists the ability to sell contraceptives, was in ef-
fect limiting access to contraceptives and therefore was an
unconstitutional burden on the fundamental right to make deci-
sions regarding childbearing.2 1 0 In a companion case to Roe v.
Wade,"' the Supreme Court, in Doe v. Bolton,1 2 struck down a
Georgia statute requiring that abortions be performed only in
accredited medical facilities. The Court reasoned that such a re-
striction limited, in a variety of ways, a woman's access to abor-
tions and, therefore, imposed an unconstitutional burden on a
woman's right to choose to have an abortion.2 '3
In Danforth, the Supreme Court held that a Missouri stat-
ute requiring the reporting and recordkeeping of information
concerning abortions was not an unconstitutional burden on the
abortion rights of women so long as the state ensures that the
reported information will not be publicly disclosed.21 Similarly,
in Whalen,1 5 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state
system of reporting and recording prescriptions of certain fre-
206. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155-56.
207. Smith, supra note 180, at 22.
208. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. at 1039.
209. Carey, 431 U.S. 678.
210. Id. at 686-91.
211. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113.
212. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
213. Id. at 193-95.
214. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79-81 (1976). See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying
text.





Although there appears to be no clear and distinct line sep-
arating an insignificant nuisance from an unconstitutional bur-
den on the right of privacy, the above cases do provide some
guidance. In those cases in which the state action was declared
unconstitutional, the state action somehow limited or made
more difficult the actual exercise of the fundamental right at is-
sue.217 In Carey, for example, the New York statute limited the
accessibility of contraceptives, the opportunity for privacy of
purchase and the possibility of price competition.21 8 Similarly in
Bolton, the Georgia statute resulted in actual limitation of ac-
cess to facilities which carry out abortions.2 19
Unlike the statutes in Carey and Bolton, the reporting stat-
utes held constitutional in Danforth and Whalen did not physi-
cally impair or limit the exercise of fundamental rights.220 The
Court's failure to strike down the statutes at issue may be ex-
plained by the fact that the scheme for reporting the perform-
ance of abortions and the prescribing of controlled medications
were unlikely to affect the decisions of persons of ordinary sensi-
tivity.22 This distinction may also account for the Court's em-
phasis in both Whalen and Danforth on the presence of security
arrangements 22 designed to prevent unwarranted public dissem-
ination of private information.2 Indeed, the presence of these
safeguards may well have convinced the Court that the record-
keeping requirements would not affect the quality of medical
216. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04.
217. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 687-88; Bolton, 410 U.S. at 192-200.
218. Carey, 431 U.S. at 689.
219. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 192-200.
220. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79-81.
221. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602-04. See also Smith, supra note 180, at 24.
222. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 594-95; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 81. See generally supra
note 90 and accompanying text (noting similar emphasis placed on the existence of se-
curity arrangements in decisions dealing with the psychotherapist-patient privilege).
223. The existence of government safeguards designed to protect subpoenaed psy-
chiatric recoids from unnecessary additional disclosure is a factor in assessing the degree
of interference with a patient's fundamental right of privacy. Some psychotherapists
faced with compelled disclosure of their records have asserted that, irrespective of
whether the confidential information is disclosed to the general public, disclosure to the
State, in and of itself, is an impermissible intrusion into individual privacy rights. See





services or deter persons of ordinary sensitivity from seeking
such services.2 4
In applying this reasoning to the issue of compelled disclos-
ure of psychiatric records, it is imperative to note the dissimilar
nature of the threat to privacy involved in the disclosure to a
state of information regarding abortions or the use of prescrip-
tion drugs and the disclosure of psychotherapeutic records. Cer-
tainly, the insult to one's privacy resulting from a disclosure of
one's psychiatric records or even the disclosure that one is re-
ceiving psychiatric treatment is far greater than that which oc-
curs when a state collects other types of medical information.2 2,
Psychiatric literature reveals that potential breaches in the
confidences of psychotherapy tend to cause both a disinclination
to enter therapy and a loss of effectiveness of psychotherapy due
to the withholding of information.226 As such, government action
which compels the disclosure of psychotherapeutic records
would appear to significantly interfere with a person's funda-
mental right to choose whether or not to undergo therapy and
disclose deeply personal information.227
c. Compelling State Interest
The fact that a fundamental right has been significantly in-
truded upon does not, of itself, compel automatic elimination of
the offending state action. A fundamental interest may be ob-
structed or regulated if there exists a "sufficiently compelling
state interest. 228
224. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04. See also McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355,
1381 (D.N.J. 1978).
225. See infra notes 264-93 and accompanying text. See supra note 116.
226. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. "The few courts that have ad-
dressed the issue have assumed that disclosure of communications between an identifi-
able patient and his psychiatrist would deter individuals from seeking care and impair
the therapy process itself." Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. at 1039. See also Caesar, 542 F.2d at
1067; Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 570-71.
227. The compelled production of psychiatric records which do not include confi-
dential communications would be less likely to cause a disinclination to enter therapy
and therefore would pose a substantially diminished intrusion into the right of
autonomy.
228. Carey, 431 U.S. at 686. For example, the protection of a viable fetus is a com-
pelling state interest that justifies certain state limitations on a woman's right to have an




The Supreme Court has not yet articulated specific guide-
lines for what constitutes a compelling state interest.229 The
Court, however, has identified three general categories of com-
pelling interests, the furtherance of which have justified in-
fringement upon fundamental rights. 230 These are: preventing
the violent overthrow of the government, 31 preserving democ-
racy,232 and resolving clashes between conflicting fundamental
rights.23 3 This list is not exhaustive. On numerous occasions, the
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of a state intru-
sion into a fundamental interest when the state action did not
involve one of these enumerated state interests.234 In Branzburg
v. Hayes,235 for example, the Court held that fundamental first
amendment rights did not relieve a journalist from his obligation
to respond to a grand jury subpoena and to answer questions
relevant to a criminal investigation.23 The Branzburg Court de-
scribed "[flair and effective law enforcement" as a "fundamental
function of government. ' 237 In Caesar v. Mountanos,235  the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit specifically
held that "[t]he state has a compelling interest to insure that
truth is ascertained in legal proceedings in its courts of law." '39
The court noted that this state interest has been held sufficient
229. See generally, Note, Of Interests, Fundamental and Compelling: The Emerg-
ing Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U.L. Rav. 462, 479 (1977).
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding Wartime
detention of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War 1I).
232. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (limiting campaign
contributions, thereby insuring proper operation of democratic processes).
233. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of a woman to terminate her
pregnancy conflicted with state interest in preserving the life of a viable fetus).
234. See Note, supra note 229, at 486-93.
235. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
236. Id. at 690-91.
237. Id. at 690. This philosophy was reiterated by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Nixon: "The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both
fundamental and comprehensive .... The very integrity of the judicial system . . . de-
pend[s] on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence."
418 U.S. 683, 709 (1973). See also United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1949).
238. 542 F.2d 1064.
239. Id. at 1069. In Caesar, the court considered a psychiatrist's refusal to obey a
court order directing him to answer questions relating to communications with a former
patient, who was the plaintiff in an action involving physical and psychological injuries




to require newsmen to testify concerning privileged communica-
tions,24 to compel testimony from witnesses who have invoked
the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination, once
immunity has been granted, 24 ' and to compel testimony before a
grand jury, concerning illegally obtained evidence.242 In addition
to the state interest in acquiring all relevant evidence in crimi-
nal proceedings, it has been held that the state also has a "com-
pelling interest in ensuring that services and supplies for which
it is being billed have been provided, and that the medicaid pro-
gram is not being defrauded. '243
Thus, although compelled production of psychiatric records
may be a significant intrusion into the fundamental rights of a
patient, there does exist a compelling state interest which may
validate the state's intrusion into these fundamental rights.
Once the state interests in the fair administration of criminal
justice and the protection of the integrity of the Medicaid pro-
gram are identified as compelling, the next stage of the constitu-
tional analysis is a determination of whether a state can demon-
strate that its actions are both necessary and the least restrictive
means possible to achieve its compelling interest.244
d. Necessity of State Action and Least Restrictive
Alternative
The scope of the government's right to legislate in areas of
fundamental individual rights depends not only on the compel-
ling nature of its interest but also on the means employed in
furtherance of that interest. For a state intrusion into a funda-
mental right to be legitimate, it must be as limited and as nar-
rowly drawn as possible and must be the least restrictive alter-
240. Id. at 1069 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
241. Caesar, 542 F.2d at 1069 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972)).
242. Caesar, 542 F.2d at 1069 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974)). See generally Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 93-94 (1964) (White,
J., concurring) (describing the "broad" power of the state to compel residents to testify
in court or before grand juries as "[a]mong the necessary and most important").
243. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. at 1041. See also Schnaubman v. Blum, 49 N.Y.2d 375,
379-80, 402 N.E.2d 1133, 1135, 426 N.Y.S.2d 230, 233 (1980) (describing the honest man-
agement of the Medicaid system as an "important public interest").




native available to advance the compelling state interest.2 4
In the context of Medicaid fraud investigations, federal law
provides explicit guidance as to the degree of disclosure of medi-
cal records actually necessary to advance the state's interest in
protecting the integrity of the Medicaid program. The applicable
federal statute establishes a relatively narrow disclosure stan-
dard, requiring the disclosure of medical records only to the ex-
tent necessary to document the actual deliverance of Medicaid-
reimbursed services.24 6
Acknowledging the narrow disclosure standard delineated in
the federal Medicaid statute, the District Court of Hawaii, in
Ariyoshi, specifically considered the degree of intrusion into psy-
chiatric records which would be necessary for the investigation
of Medicaid fraud and therefore constitutionally permissible.
The court held that there was "no evidence that review by the
State of personal and confidential information contained in a
psychiatrist's patient files is necessary to prevent fraud. The de-
tails of a patient's problems are not necessary to an evaluation
of whether a psychiatrist is rendering services in the amount
claimed. 247
Holding that the disclosure of confidential psychotherapeu-
tic communications was not necessary for effective oversight of
245. Id.; See also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; Carey, 431 U.S. at 686.
246. The federal statute dealing with maintenance and disclosure of records by
Medicaid providers requires each state Medicaid plan to:
provide for agreements with every person or institution providing services under
the State plan under which such person or institution agrees (A) to keep such
records as are necessary fully to disclose the extent of the services provided to
individuals receiving assistance under the State plan, and (B) to furnish the State
agency or the Secretary with such information, regarding any payments claimed
by such person or institution for providing services under the State plan, as the
State agency or Secretary may from time to time request.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(27) (1982).
Under the federal regulation promulgated to implement this statute, each state
Medicaid plan must require providers of medicaid services to agree to:
(1) Keep any records necessary to disclose the extent of services the provider fur-
nishes to recipients; [and] (2) On requests, furnish to the Medicaid agency, the
Secretary, or the State Medicaid fraud control unit (if such a unit has been ap-
proved by the Secretary under § 455.300 of this chapter), any information main-
tained under paragraph (b)(1) of this section and any information regarding pay-
ments claimed by the provider for furnishing services under the plan.
42 C.F.R. § 431.107(b) (1985).
247. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. at 1041-42.
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the Medicaid program, the Ariyoshi court looked to the exis-
tance of less intrusive means of achieving the state interests.24
Specifically, the court described a procedure in which psycho-
therapists, whose records were being sought by investigators,
could review their files and delete those portions which contain
confidential matters. 4 9 If, based on a review of the redacted
records, state investigators determined that a reasonable suspi-
cion existed that a provider was defrauding the state, a warrant
to inspect more sensitive records might then be available.250 The
court found that the availability of such less burdensome alter-
natives for achieving the state interest 2 1 in controlling Medicaid
fraud cast "considerable doubt" on the constitutionality of the
Hawaii statute.28 2
Indeed, regarding investigations into the length and fre-
quency of treatment and the identity of the participants, nota-
tions made by a therapist in his progress notes are unlikely to
reveal greater significant information than the contents of ap-
pointment books and time and billing records. 253 In addition, as
248. Id. at 1042.
249. Id.
250. Id. Although such a program appears on its face to fulfill the needs of the state,
a valid argument can be made that any redaction of records performed by a psychothera-
pist who is the target of an investigation can reasonably be expected to result in suppres-
sion of both patient communications and any incriminating materials.
251. Id. Such less intrusive means have been described in greater detail by other
courts. See supra note 72. See also Smith, supra note 180, at 36.
252. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. at 1042. Note that the statute at issue in this case called
for the issuance of administrative inspection warrants to search the offices and records of
Medicaid providers. Id. at 1029.
253. The range of communications relevant to legitimate psychotherapy is so broad
that, as a practical matter, very little information useful to a Medicaid billing investiga-
tion can be gleaned from notes generally made by psychotherapists. Long periods of si-
lence, monologue by the patient, dialogue between patients or patient and therapist are
common and are therapeutically appropriate. Records of such communications are rarely
uniform, far from complete and therefore have little, if anything, to do with inquiries as
to billing accuracy. See Slovenko, On the Need for Recordkeeping in the Practice of
Psychiatry, 7 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 399, 403 (1979) (acknowledging the existence of nearly
200 forms of psychotherapy). See generally L. KOLa, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 767-
804 (1977).
It is significant to note that the federal Medicaid statutes require the production of
records to disclose fully the extent of services provided rather than the quality or medi-
cal necessity of the services. If quality or necessity were at issue, then perhaps compelled
production of records containing the essentials of the therapeutic session would be
justified.
Commenting on this, the Ariyoshi court noted: "[T]he state has no more interest in
43
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protections for the confidences of therapy diminish, patients can
be expected to withhold information from therapists,65 and
therapists faced with possible disclosure of their files may tend
to keep scantier records so as to protect their patient's confiden-
tiality.256 Paradoxically, therefore, by coercing the revelation of
therapeutic communications, state action ostensibly designed to
enhance the availability of probative evidence may counter-
productively effectuate the removal from psychiatric records of
the very information originally sought by the state. Thus, it can
hardly be argued that state action which may actually impede
the availability of evidence is either necessary to or the least re-
strictive possible method of securing all available evidence.
In evaluating whether a state action which compels the pro-
duction of psychiatric records is the least restrictive alternative,
paramount consideration should be given to the presence or ab-
sence of safeguards designed to prevent unnecessary disclos-
ure. 68 Surely, a state Medicaid investigating scheme which fails
to safeguard the confidentiality of private records cannot be con-
sidered the least restrictive means possible and therefore is un-
likely to withstand a constitutional challenge 2 7
It appears therefore, that compelled disclosure of full psy-
chiatric records, including patient communications and therapist
ensuring the quality of care provided Medicaid beneficiaries than that provided patients
who pay. The states have uniformly chosen to pursue that interest by regulating the
licensing of medical practitioners and medical facilities." Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. at 1042.
See also Perlman & Schwartz, Medical Records and the Psychiatric Private Sector, 137
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY, 1586, 1587 (1980); Perlman, Schwartz, Paris, Thornton, Smith &
Weber, Psychiatric Records: Variations Based on Discipline and Patient Characteris-
tics, with Implications for Quality of Care, 139 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1154, 1155-56 (1982).
One authority has suggested that the evidentiary requirements of relevancy and ma-
teriality provide the best protection against unnecessary disclosure of confidential psy-
chotherapeutic records. "[Tihe confidentiality of a physician-patient or psychotherapist-
patient communication is protected from disclosure in a courtroom only by a showing
that the communication would have no relevance or materiality to the issues in the
case." Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial Privilege: A Picture of Misguided
Hope, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 649, 659 (1974).
254. See supra note 41.
255. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 89-90, 116-17, 131 and accompanying text.
257. See Smith, supra note 180, at 36. "[Flailure to safeguard against unnecessary
intrusions into .. .privacy raises serious doubts whether these jurisdictions can legiti-
mately rely on the compelling state interest in obtaining all relevant testimony to justify




observations, is not the least restrictive means available to fully
disclose the extent of services provided by psychotherapists par-
ticipating in the Medicaid program. The production of appoint-
ment books, billing records and other fragmentary data would
appear to be minimally restrictive and sufficiently effective to
satisfy fully the Medicaid program's statutory requirements. 58
e. Balancing Competing Interests
Even if it can be demonstrated that a state action meets
each of the previous criteria, the compelling state interest test
requires a balancing of the benefits to the state interest against
the "extent of the burden that they place on individual
rights." '259 In such a balancing test, governmental action which is
necessary to the advancement of a compelling state interest, at
only a minimal cost to a fundamental right, will likely pass con-
stitutional muster. State action, however, which only minimally
advances a compelling state interest at a significant cost to a
fundamental right is unlikely to receive constitutional
approbation.2 60
This balancing analysis is substantially similar to that used
by most courts adjudicating claims based on the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege.26 1 Once again, in the context of Medicaid
fraud investigations, factors which are often determinative in
such a balancing analysis are the nature and degree of intrusive-
ness of the requests for information and the presence or absence
of state guarantees of continued confidentiality.
f. Conclusion of Autonomy Analysis
Thus, under the autonomy strand of the right of privacy, it
is likely that in an adjudication of a psychotherapist's challenge
to compelled production of records pursuant to an investigation
of Medicaid fraud courts will reach conclusions similar to those
reached in Kobrin26 2 and other cases which utilized a balancing
258. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
259. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
260. For a detailed analysis of this balancing approach, see Note, supra note 229, at
493-94.
261. See supra notes 91-119 and accompanying text.




approach to determine the applicability and scope of the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege. When subpoenaed records are
limited to those containing only fragmentary data213 such as ap-
pointment books and billing and time records, and when there
exist safeguards against further, unnecessary disclosure, courts
are likely to find that the limited intrusion into the privacy
rights of the patient will be outweighed by the state's need to
investigate suspected Medicaid fraud. When, however, the
records sought are more detailed psychological profiles or ac-
counts of patient communications, or where the continued confi-
dentiality of the psychiatric record is not somehow protected,
courts will be more likely to find the state action to be a consti-
tutionally impermissible intrusion into individual autonomy
rights.
2. Right of Informational Privacy
The second element of the right of privacy identified by the
Supreme Court in Whalen is the right to avoid the disclosure of
personal matters.2 "6 This right of "informational privacy" pro-
tects confidential information which a person generally does not
release to others except for the most compelling of reasons.265
a. Informational Privacy in Psychotherapy
In this regard, no information can be more intensely per-
sonal and confidential than that contained in the files of a psy-
chotherapist.2 " Because of the intimate nature of the subject
matter of psychotherapy, 267 patients undergoing treatment usu-
263. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
264. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599.
265. This kind of information has been described as that "which a person desires to
keep private and which, if disseminated, would tend to cause substantial concern, anxi-
ety or embarrassment to a reasonable person." Leigh, Informational Privacy: Constitu-
tional Challenges to the Collection and Dissemination of Personal Information by Gov-
ernment Agencies, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 229, 251 (1976).
266. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. See also Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp.
at 1043; L. KOLB, supra note 253, at 767-804.
267. Psychotherapy deals not only with an exchange of information between patient
and psychotherapist, but also with the patient's most intimate self, his dreams, his fears,
and quite often subjects of such intensity that they have been relegated to the subcon-
scious. Because of the unique nature of the psychotherapist-patient relationship, pa-




ally have a high expectation that the information they reveal
will be kept confidential. 68 It has been held that such an inter-
est in keeping confidential revelations from public purview
"draws sustenance from our constitutional heritage."26 9 Thus,
psychotherapeutic communications and records containing such
communication demand constitutional protection under the
right of informational privacy.2 70
b. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court has yet to provide explicit guidance as
to the proper standard of review to be applied under the infor-
mational privacy strand of the general right to privacy.27 1 In
Whalen, however, the Court implicitly utilized a balancing stan-
dard in upholding the New York State drug prescription report-
ing statute. The Court weighed the societal interests served by
the statute against the degree and effect of the intrusion into
individual privacy interests caused by enforcement of the
statute.
27 1
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,73 the Su-
preme Court considered former President Nixon's challenge to a
federal statute which permitted professional archivists to screen
presidential papers. Acknowledging that Nixon had a legitimate
informational privacy interest in portions of the material in
question, the Court balanced the competing interests for and
against disclosure and upheld the enforcement of the federal
See also Caesar, 542 F.2d 1064. "Communications between a patient and his or her psy-
chotherapist often involve intimate medical problems of family, marriage, motherhood
and fatherhood, human sexuality, and almost always concern strong emotional needs of
the patient." Id. at 1072.
268. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967) (In determin-
ing extent of privacy interests, the reasonable expectation of privacy is of utmost signifi-
cance). See also Meyer & Smith, A Crisis in Group Therapy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 638,
639 (1977) (84'(' of subjects in the study assumed that confidentiality in psychotherapy
included a refusal to testify about a patient even if validly ordered to do so by a court of
law).
269. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 431, 467 P.2d 557, 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 839
(1970).
270. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. at 1043. Contra J.P. v. Desanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir.
1981) (no constitutional right protects non-disclosure of juveniles' social histories).
271. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. at 1043.
272. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600-03.





Explicit guidance regarding the adjudication of claims
under the constitutional right of informational privacy has been
provided by the Fifth Circuit in Plante v. Gonzalez.2 75 Uphold-
ing financial disclosure laws for certain public officials, the court
held that when the right to privacy is invoked to protect confi-
dential information, a balancing standard is appropriate.278 The
court contrasted this to the right of autonomy which, when in-
voked, triggers a compelling state interest analysis. 7 The court
stressed that in applying this balancing standard, a constitu-
tional right is at stake and therefore, "more than mere rational-
ity must be demonstrated . . ." to justify a state intrusion. 278
The balancing approaches of Nixon and Plante have been
adopted by courts adjudicating informational privacy claims in-
volving the release of psychological information in the screening
of job applicants,279 and the disclosure of psychotherapeutic
communications in a criminal trial.280 In Ariyoshi,281 the Hawaii
District Court directly considered the proper standard of review
under the right of informational privacy as applied to an investi-
gation of a psychiatrist's Medicaid billing practices.282 The
Ariyoshi court held that "the appropriate test under the confi-
dentiality strand of the privacy right ... is to balance the state
interests served . . . against the intrusion into an individual's
privacy. '2 s In such a balance test, however, because of the
274. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 442-48. The statute at issue was the Presidential Recordings
and Materials Preservation Act. 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1982) (current version at 44 U.S.C. §
2107 (1986)). Factors included in the Court's balancing analysis were the limited nature
of the intrusion, the impossibility of separating personal material from public documents
and the magnitude of the public interest involved.
275. 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978).
276. Id. at 1134.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp 1355 (D.N.J. 1978) (assessing the constitu-
tionality of psychological testing used by Jersey City to screen fire department
applications).
280. See Ceasar, 542 F.2d 1064 (involving an appeal from contempt proceedings fol-
lowing a refusal to obey a court order directing a psychiatrist to answer questions regard-
ing communications with a former patient who was a defendant in a criminal
proceeding).
281. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028.
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highly sensitive nature of the protected zone of privacy, a bur-
densome regulation may only be justified by a compelling state
interest."8 4 This therefore places a "great weight on the privacy
end of the traditional balancing test. ' 2
5
Similarly, in In re Zuniga,8 6 the Sixth Circuit applied a
balancing analysis in a case involving a psychiatrist's claim that
his patient files, subpoenaed in a grand jury investigation of bill-
ing fraud, were protected by his patient's rights of informational
privacy.2 7 Assuming arguendo the existence of such a right, the
court balanced the limited nature of the intrusion2 88 against the
"need for the grand jury to conduct an effective and comprehen-
sive investigation into [an] alleged violation of the law. '289 The
court concluded that the enforcement of the subpoenas did not
unconstitutionally infringe upon the rights of the involved
patients.2 9
As in the final analysis of the autonomy strand of the right
of privacy, the appropriate standard of review under the infor-
mational strand is a balancing standard.29 1 This standard is
closely analogous to the balancing approach utilized by courts
adjudicating claims under the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege. 9 Therefore, as the intrusion into the right of informa-
tional privacy increases (by virtue of the character of the infor-
mation sought and the likelihood of unnecessary disclosure) so
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 73-89 and accompa-
nying text.
287. Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 641.
288. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
289. Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 642.
290. Id.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 275-90. See also Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d
1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1981) ("An intrusion into the interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal information will thus only be upheld when the government demonstrates a legiti-
mate state interest which is found to outweigh the threat to the plaintiff's privacy
interest.").
292. Although closely analogous, the balance tests are distinguishable. Unlike privi-
lege cases, courts adjudicating constitutional privacy issues first address the threshhold
question of whether the interest advanced by the state action is compelling.
In the context of Medicaid fraud investigations, however, this distinction is inconse-
quential. In all privacy cases it has been held that the interests of the state in maintain-




too will the burden on the state to justify such an intrusion.2 93
Thus, under the informational strand of the constitutional
right of privacy, the outcome of cases involving the investigation
of suspected Medicaid fraud on the part of psychotherapists will
likely be identical to those cases decided under the autonomy
strand of the constitutional right or the psychotherapist-patient
evidentiary privilege. When subpoenaed records include detailed
psychological profiles or patient communications, or when the
threat of additional unnecessary disclosure of the records is
great, courts will likely find the state interest in obtaining those
records to be outweighed by the individual's interest in main-
taining confidentiality. When on the other hand, the subpoenaed
records are limited to those containing only fragmentary data,
and there exist safeguards against further disclosure of the
records, the state's interests in the fair administration of justice
and in maintaining the integrity of the Medicaid program will
likely outweigh the limited intrusion into the informational pri-
vacy interests of the patient.
IV. Safeguards Against Disclosure of Confidential Information
A. General Federal Regulations
In the context of subpoenaed psychiatric records, a signifi-
cant factor in the determination of the scope and effect of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege and the constitutional right of
privacy is the presence of safeguards designed to protect subpoe-
naed information from further, unnecessary disclosure. In this
regard, governmental access to and use of private information
has received considerable legislative attention in the recent past.
On the federal level, two pieces of legislation, the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA)294 and the Privacy Act of 1974295 both
affect individual privacy interests in medical records held by
governmental agencies.
While the purpose of the FOIA is generally to permit public
access to federal records, 9 the Act also specifies exemptions for
293. See infra text accompanying notes 259-61.
294. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
295. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
296. H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, (reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2418). See generally Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352
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certain materials such as those relating to national security,
trade secrets, and personal and medical files "the disclosure of
which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy. 212 These statutory exemptions are narrowly construed so
as to effectuate the legislative intent.298 If this medical record
exception to the FOIA is found to apply, protections enunciated
in the Privacy Act of 1974 then take effect.2"
The language of the Privacy Act of 1974 indicates that an
individual's right of privacy is both "personal and fundamen-
tal."300 The Act, whose stated purpose, inter alia, is to "promote
governmental respect for the privacy of citizens,"3 1 requires
government agencies which use or store personal information to
comply with privacy mandates, including a strict prohibition
against disclosure of the information.302 Failure to comply with
the provisions of the Privacy Act can result in both civil actions
against the agency in possession of the information0s and crimi-
nal penalties against the officer or employee who willfully dis-
closes the information.0 4
(1976).
297. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(6) (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
298. When a party makes a FOIA request for a medical file held by a government
agency, the agency must determine: first, if the material is indeed a medical file and thus
governed by the medical records exception; and, second, assuming it is excepted, whether
disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of individual privacy interests. See,
e.g., Washington Post v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 260
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
Agency refusal to disclose is subject to judicial review in the federal district court. In
such cases, courts undertake the same two step analysis performed by the agency. If,
however, the agency grants disclosure, the individual who is the subject of the medical
record may bring an action in federal district court to preclude disclosure. See Consum-
ers Union v. Consumers Prod. Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209, 1215 nn.27-28 (D.C. Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, sub. nom G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375 (1980).
299. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(6) (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
300. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
301. S. Rep. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6916.
302. Id. Under the Privacy Act, agencies are not permitted to disclose information
about an individual even to another government agency without the individual's written
consent. One exception to this prohibition, however, is a permitted release of information
necessary for law enforcement activities.
See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b)(7) (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
303. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(1) (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
304. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(i)(1) (West 1977 & Supp. 1985). A violation of provisions of
the Privacy Act is a misdemeanor subjecting the violator to fines of up to $5,000.
51
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Thus, in the federal system, general safeguards, designed to
prevent unnecessary disclosure of confidential records, do exist.
In light of legislative intent to subject more federal records to
public scrutiny, however, these general statutory safeguards do
not appear to provide adequate protection to counterbalance the
intrusiveness of certain compelled disclosures of psychiatric pa-
tient files in Medicaid fraud investigations.3 0 5
B. Confidentiality in the Medicaid Program
In Medicaid fraud investigations, records are subpoenaed
generally by either the State Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of
the State Attorney General's Offices 6 or a grand jury. Grand
jury proceedings are secret 07 and any violation of that secrecy is
a criminal offense.308 Records retained by the State Medicaid
Fraud Control Units are subject to federal regulations designed
to "protect the privacy rights of [Medicaid] recipients.3 0 1
These regulations limit the release of medical information
to "purposes directly connected with the administration of the
[Medicaid] plan."310 The types of information protected by these
regulations include "at least-(1) Names and addresses; (2) Medi-
cal services provided; (3) Social and economic conditions or cir-
cumstances; (4) Agency evaluation of personal information; and
(5) Medical data, including diagnosis and past history of disease
305. In deciding whether or not to disclose medical records, government agencies
balance the individual's interest in non-disclosure against the public interest in favor of
disclosure. See Washington Post, 690 F.2d at 260. Mindful of the legislative intent be-
hind the FOIA, toward disclosure rather than secrecy, courts have tipped the balance in
favor of disclosure. Id. at 261. See also Rose, 425 U.S. at 361.
306. The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977 provided
for the establishment of state Medicaid Fraud Control Units to protect the program
from fraudulent practices. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396b(q) (West 1983 & Supp. 1985). Federal
regulations require that when a fraud control unit determines that provider records may
be useful in investigations of suspected fraud it shall have: "[aiccess to any information
kept by providers to which the agency is authorized access." 42 C.F.R. § 455.21(a)(2)(iii)
(1985).
307. This is governed by state law. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 190.25(4) (Mc-
Kinney 1985). See also In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 642 (6th Cir. 1983) (acknowledging
protection of records by the "veil of secrecy attending grand jury proceedings").
308. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW. § 215.70 (McKinney 1985).
309. 42 C.F.R. § 455.21(a)(2)(iii) (1985). See also 42 C.F.R. § 431.300-.307 (1985)
(safeguarding information on applicants and recipients).




or disability."31 These regulations apply to all requests for in-
formation "including [those from] government bodies, the
courts, or law enforcement officials. '3 12
Of course, once a suspected perpetrator of Medicaid fraud is
brought to trial, the contents of all records admitted into evi-
dence become a matter of public record. It is at trial, however,
that courts adjudicating the cases may themselves provide safe-
guards against public disclosure of confidential information.
Such safeguards may include in camera inspection, masking of
patient identities through partial redaction of the records, pro-
tective orders and, at the conclusion of the case, sealing the
file.313
Thus, although general federal regulations may not provide
safeguards adequate to prevent unwarranted disclosure of confi-
dential data, the regulations governing the investigation of
Medicaid fraud, the laws governing the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings and the broad powers of the court to fashion protec-
tive orders would appear to reduce substantially the intrusive-
ness of compelled disclosure of psychiatric records. Although
substantially reduced, in the context of psychotherapeutic
records, a balancing of this intrusiveness against the state's in-
terests in the administration of criminal justice and effective
oversight of the Medicaid program will tip in favor of disclosure
only if the records at issue do not contain sensitive patient com-
munications or equally confidential material.
V. Conclusion
In the context of Medicaid fraud investigations, psychother-
apists claiming protection of their patient records by way of the
constitutional right of privacy will acquire no greater degree of
protection against compelled disclosure than those seeking to
311. 42 C.F.R. § 431.305(b) (1985).
312. 42 C.F.R. § 431.306(e) (1985).
313. See Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 1970) ("[A] trial court
is duty-bound, where it orders production of documents in which there are strong policy
reasons against public disclosure, to limit the availability and use of those documents
and their contents by carefully drawn protective provisions.") See also Lora v. Board of
Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (In addition to protective orders limiting use





shield their records via statutory and common law psychothera-
pist-patient evidentiary privileges.3 14
Courts inquiring as to the scope of the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege or the constitutional right of privacy will each
conduct a balancing analysis of the probity of the evidence
sought as weighed against the degree of intrusion into a patient's
privacy interests.3 15 Factors pertinent to such an inquiry are the
nature and content of the records sought and the availability of
safeguards designed to protect against unwarranted additional
disclosure. 1
In an inquiry of suspected Medicaid billing fraud, the con-
tent of psychotherapeutic communications yields little probative
evidence that cannot be obtained elsewhere and at a lesser cost
to individual privacy. 17 As such, demands for such records
should not receive constitutional approbation. When records
sought do not include such intimate information, the protections
against unnecessary disclosure inherent in the Medicaid and the
grand jury systems will be sufficient to tip the balance in favor
of disclosure of such probative and minimally intrusive data.
Peter N. Bassano
314. See supra notes 60-131, 262, 293 and accompanying text. The advantages of
arguing the constitutional issue are not to be discounted, however. Constitutional privacy
rights are permanent. They do not yield to local law nor can they be easily discarded by
legislative enactments.
315. See supra notes 80-84, 111-13, 259-61 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 89-90, 117, 144-46, 245-58 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 247-53 and accompanying text.
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